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Abstract 
We present a general model of legislative bargaining in which the status quo is an 
arbitrary point in a multidimensional policy space. In contrast to other bargaining 
models, the status quo is not assumed to be "bad," and delay may be Pareto efficient. 
We prove existence of stationary equilibria. The possibility of equilibrium delay depends 
on four factors : risk aversion of the legislators , the dimensionality of the policy space, 
the voting rule ,  and the possibility of transfers across districts. If legislators are risk 
averse, if there is more than one policy dimension, and if voting is by majority rule, for 
example, then delay will almost never occur. In one dimension, delay is possible if and 
only if the status quo lies in the core of the voting rule, and then it is the only possible 
outcome. This "core selection" result yields a game-theoretic foundation for the well­
known median voter theorem. Our comparative statics analysis yield two noteworthy 
insights: (i) if the status quo is close to the core, then equilibrium policy outcomes will 
also be close to the core (a moderate status quo produces moderate policy outcomes) , 
and (ii) if legislators are patient, then equilibrium proposals will be close to the core 
(legislative patience leads to policy moderation) . 
1 Introduction 
A central objective of research in political economy is to obtain a general understanding 
of the determinants of public policy in a majoritarian society. Black's (1958) median 
voter theorem provides compelling predictions when policies are restricted to a single 
dimension, but the theory of social choice has yielded quite negative results on the 
absence of majority rule equilibria in multiple dimensions. 1 A tool of potential impor­
tance in surmounting this obstacle is the non-cooperative theory of bargaining, deriving 
from the work of Rubinstein (1982). The theory has found numerous applications, in­
cluding distributive politics (Baron and Ferejohn, 1989), government formation (Merlo, 
1997, Diermeier, Eraslan, and Merlo, 2002), international relations (Powell, 2002), and 
bankruptcy (Eraslan, 2002). Applications to policy-making in a legislative body, how­
ever, are few in number and limited by the implicit assumption, nearly universal in the 
game-theoretic literature on bargaining, that failure to reach an agreement is worse for 
all legislators than every possible bargaining outcome. 
This assumption of a "bad status quo" can be traced to Rubinstein (1982), who 
considers the problem of two people who must agree on a division of a "cake" and who 
take turns maldng offers and responding to offers. In the simplest version of this model, 
a legislator's payoff just equals his/her share of the cake, and, therefore, the payoff in 
any period an agreement is not reached is simply zero: the status quo in this model is 
no cake, which is obviously worse for the legislators than any division the two might 
decide on. Binmore (1987) elaborates on the basic framework by allowing the proposer 
to be randomly selected in each period. In a seminal paper ,  Baron and Ferejohn (1989) 
apply this approach to model legislative allocation of pork barrel goods, assuming any 
finite number of legislators and voting by majority rule: in their closed-rule model, 
a legislator is randomly selected to propose an allocation of spending across districts; 
if this proposal is passed by a majority of the legislature, then the game ends with 
that allocation; otherwise, the game continues to the next period, where this process is 
repeated. Legislators do not enjoy the benefits of pork until it is allocated and so, as in 
the basic model, the status quo is zero. The theory of bargaining in distributive settings 
is now well-developed,2 but the application to pork barrel spending misses the public 
good aspect of public policy and the fact that "more" is not always preferred to "less . "  
The first application to public policy is due t o  Baron (1991), who considers examples 
of policy-making in a two-dimensional issue space, assuming three and four legislators 
and quadratic utilities. Thus , each legislator has circular indifference curves centered 
around a unique "ideal point" in the policy space. Legislators are assumed to be perfectly 
1See Plott (196 7), Rubinstein (1979), Schofield (1983), Cox (1984), Le Breton (1987), McKelvey and 
Schofield (1987), Banks (1995), and Saari (1997). 
2Theoretical analyses building on this work have s tudied risk aversion (Harrington, 1989, 1990a,b ), 
externalities in consumption (Calvert and Dietz, 1996), veto rules (Winter, 1996; McCarty, 2000), 
a stochastic cake (Merlo and Wilson, 1995; Eraslan and Merlo, 2002), and uniqueness of stationary 
equilibria (Eraslan, 2002; Cho and Duggan, 2002). 
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patient , however, so that delay is costless and considerations of the status quo are moot. 
Jackson and Moselle (2002) assume a one-dimensional policy space in addition to a 
cake, and Banks and Duggan (2000) generalize the above models by simply allowing 
any convex set of policies and concave utilities. There, we prove existence of stationary 
equilibria in multidimensional issue spaces and, for the case of one dimension, we show 
that the equilibrium outcomes of bargaining converge to the ideal point of the median 
voter as the legislators place greater weight on the future. These models of policy­
making, except for Baron (1991) who imposes perfect patience, follow the above-cited 
papers in assuming a bad status quo. But while that assumption may be reasonable in 
the context of dividing a cake or distributing pork, it is less desirable in a bargaining 
model of policy-mak ing, where it is likely that at least some legislators are happy with 
the status quo - and it is very unlikely that every legislator prefers every policy to the 
status quo. 
In this paper, we model the status quo as an arbitrary, perhaps Pareto efficient, 
policy. We follow Banks and Duggan (2000) by allowing for a general multidimensional 
issue space and general utility functions on the part of legislators. We assume the 
proposer in any period is randomly selected, as in Baron and Ferejohn (1989) , but 
agreement is determined by an arbitrary voting rule, which we model as a collection 
of "decisive" coalitions. This captures unanimity rule and majority rule, allows veto 
rules , and even allows the legislators to be partitioned into two "houses ," a majority in 
each required for passage. Our model generates insights into some well-known special 
cases, including Romer and Rosenthal's (1978a,b) agenda-setting model, in which a fixed 
proposer makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer subject to a majority vote, as well as Krehbiel's 
(1996, 1998) model of a unicameral legislature with a filibuster rule and executive veto. 
We capture these one-shot models by assuming impatient legislators (setting discount 
factors equal to zero) and a single issue dimension, but our general framework allows 
us to investigate the effects of adding an infinite-horizon (positive discount factors) and 
more issue dimensions. Similarly, imbedding the model of Baron and Ferejohn (1989) 
in our framework, we can consider the effects of changing the status quo from zero to, 
for example, equal division. We show, for example, that adding an infinite horizon to 
the Romer-Rosenthal or Krehbiel models does not affect their results when utilities are 
quadratic, while a positive status quo in the Baron-Ferejohn model reduces the rents of 
the proposer. 
Our first general result is that,  despite the fact that some legislators may favor the 
status quo, there always exists a stationary equilibrium in which every proposal made 
passes, i. e . ,  there exists a "no-delay" stationary equilibrium. Furthermore, we prove 
that the no-delay stationary equilibrium proposals are upper hemicontinuous in the pa­
rameters of the model: small perturbations of the parameters cannot produce equilibria 
far from those at the original specification . This is illustrated in Romer and Rosen­
thal's (1978a,b) agenda-setting model, where the setter's  proposal varies continuously 
with voter ideal points and the status quo. An implication is that,  if we give voters a 
small amount of patience and give the agenda setter a proposal probability slightly less 
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than one, then equilibrium outcomes will be close to Romer and Rosenthal's solution. 
And if we imbed their model in a multidimensional space and ideal points are close to 
collinear, then equilibrium outcomes will again be close to the original ones. Similar 
observations also hold for Krehbiel's (1996, 1998) legislative model. And if we modify 
the Baron and Ferejohn (1989) model to allow for a status quo with slightly positive 
cake consumptions or if we give the legislators a small amount of risk aversion, then the 
equilibrium outcomes will be close to theirs. 
An advantage of our approach to modelling the status quo is that we can now more 
meaningfully consider the possibility of delay in bargaining, which, among the above­
mentioned models, was possible only with some probability of a larger cake in the future 
(Merlo and Wilson, 1995 ; Eraslan and Merlo, 2002) .3 We show that the possibility of 
delay depends critically on four factors: the risk aversion of the legislators, the dimen­
sionality of the policy space, the voting rule used, and the possibility of transfers. We 
prove that delay is possible in our model, but only if legislators are risk neutral and 
transfers are impossible or if the equilibrium is "static," in the sense that the status quo 
is the outcome in every period with probability one. Furthermore, we show that static 
equilibria are possible if and only if the status quo lies in the "core" of the underlying 
voting game, i.e. , there is no decisive coalition with the incentive to overturn it. Thus, 
delay can occur only under very specific circumstances. We can say more when there 
are two or more policy dimensions and voting is by majority rule: since the majority 
core is almost surely empty in such environments , there will almost always be immediate 
ag reement in equilibrium. In contrast, if voting is by unanimity rule, then the core is 
just the set of Pareto optimal policies, which is nonempty and generally quite large. We 
prove that, if the status quo is Pareto optimal, then it is the unique stationary equilib­
rium outcome of the model: either delay will be permanent or the status quo may be 
proposed and passed, but no other policies are possible. 
Our results on majority rule are sharpest for one dimension. We show that, not only 
is the status quo being in the core necessary and sufficient for the existence of at least 
one static equilibrium, but it implies that every stationary equilibrium is static. Thus, 
when the status quo is in the core, the equilibrium outcome of bargaining (which is the 
status quo every period) necessarily lies in the core. We refer to this phenomenon as 
"core selection," related to the notion of "core equivalence" in Banks and Duggan (2000) . 
In contrast to the results in that paper, which assume very patient legislators, here we 
make no assumption about the rate of time discounting by legislators, though we must 
assume that the status quo is in the core, an issue that does not arise when legislators 
do not care about delay. When voting is by majority rule, of course, it is known that 
the core consists of the median policies , and our core selection result yields a new game­
theoretic perspective on Black's (1958) median voter theorem: whereas Black arrives 
at the median from a social choice theory approach, we give conditions under which 
strategic, forward-looking legislators arrive at the same outcome. We also show that, 
if the status quo is not in the core, then it is never proposed. Thus , occurrence of 
3Delay can also be obtained by adding incomplete information to the model. See Rubinstein (1985). 
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the status quo in equilibrium is "all or nothing, " i.e. , it is always proposed by every 
legislator (if it is in the core) or never proposed by any legislator (if it is outside the 
core) . We show that there will always be at least one core point that is proposed with 
positive probability in equilibrium, but, if the status quo is not in the core, then there 
will necessarily be other policies proposed too. 
Finally, we present comparative static results on the patience of legislators and on 
the location of the status quo. Our results apply either if there is a single issue dimension 
or even in multiple dimensions if voting is by unanimity rule. First, as a corollary of 
our core selection and continuity results , if the status quo is close to the core, then the 
stationary equilibrium proposals of the legislators will also be close to the core. In other 
words, moderate status quos lead to moderate policy outcomes. Second, if the legislators 
are sufficiently patient , then, regardless of the location of the status quo, all equilibrium 
proposals will be arbitrarily close to the core. That is, legislative patience leads to policy 
moderation. The latter comparative static delivers an asymptotic version of the median 
voter theorem, one that is independent of the location of the status quo. It also suggests 
the following for the design of electoral institutions, which are unmodelled here: if we 
view the discount factor of a legislator as corresponding to the probability of reelection, 
then systems that offer a sufficient incumbency advantage will lead to moderate policies. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the model and 
formal definition of our equilibrium concept .  In Section 3, we present a number of special 
cases, including the Romer and Rosenthal (1978a,b) agenda-setting model , Kriehbiel's 
(1996 ,  1998) legislative bargaining model, and a version of the Baron and Ferejohn (1989) 
bargaining model with an arbitrary status quo. In Section 4, we present our results on 
equilibrium existence, stability of the status quo, and core selection. In Section 5, we 
end with some concluding remarks. An Appendix contains proofs of theorems and other 
technical considerations. 
2 The Legislative Bargaining Model 
Let X � � denote a nonempty, compact, convex set of policies with at least two 
policy alternatives, and let q E X denote the status quo policy. Let N = {1 ,  . . .  , n} 
denote a set of legislators , with n ;:::: 2, who play an infinite-horizon bargaining game 
over the set of policies . The timing of interaction is as follows. If no policy has been 
accepted prior to period t, then (1)  legislator i is recognized with probability Pi ;:::: 0, 
where L,iEN Pi = 1 ;  then (2) the selected legislator i makes a proposal Pi E X; then 
(3) every legislator j E N simultaneously votes to either accept or reject the proposal. 
The recognition probabilities, p1, . . . , Pn, are exogenously fixed throughout the game. Let 
1J � 2N \ {0} denote a collection of decisive coalitions, also exogenously fixed. 4 If the 
group of legislators voting for the proposal is decisive, i. e . ,  {j E N I j accepts } E V, 
4In the terminology of cooperative game theory, 'D describes a "simple game," and the elements of 
'D are "winning coalitions.'' 
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then the proposal Pi is the chosen policy and bargaining ends with outcome Pi in period 
t and in every subsequent period. Otherwise, the outcome in period t is q, and steps 1-3 
are repeated for period t + 1 .  
We impose on the voting rule V only the minimal conditions that it is nonempty and 
monotonic) in the sense that any superset of a decisive coalition is itself decisive: C E V 
and C � C' imply C' E V. Thus, we allow for a variety of voting rules beyond majority 
rule (V = {C �N I I CI > n/2}) ,  such as unanimity rule (V = {N}) ,  and dictatorship 
(V = {C �N I i E C} for some i E N) . For another example, a proposal may require 
a majority of legislators other than a designated legislator, say n, to pass, i .e. , 
Letting Pn = 1 ,  we have the set-up of the agenda-setting model of Romer and Rosenthal 
(1978a,b) , where legislator n plays the role of agenda setter. Or we can capture a 
unicameral legislature and executive with a filibuster rule ( 3 / 5 cloture rule) and executive 
veto (2/3 override rule) as follows. Letting n denote the executive and N \ {n} the 
legislature, define 
That is, a coalition is decisive if it contains two thirds of the legislature or three fifths 
plus the executive. Letting m denote the "median" legislator and Pm = 1 ,  we have the 
set-up of the legislative model of Krehbiel (1996, 1998) . Some of our results do use the 
assumption that V is proper, i.e . ,  if C E V, then N \ C tf. V. This is clearly a weal<: 
condition: when V is used to define strict social preferences, as in the theory of social 
choice, it is always satisfied. 
Each legislator i 's  preferences over sequences of policy outcomes are described by a 
von Neumann-Morgenstern utility representation Ui: X ---+ � and a common discount 
factor 8 E [O, 1 ) as follows. Given a sequence x1, x2 , . . .  of policies over time, legislator 
i 's payoff takes the usual form: 
00 
(1 - 8) L 8t-lui(xt)· 
t=l 
Of course, the outcomes of the bargaining game defined above are of a simple form: 
either the status quo obtains in every period, in which case i 's payoff is just ui(q), or 
some other proposal is passed in some period; in that case, i receives payoff 
if policy x is proposed and accepted in period t .  
We assume throughout that each ui is continuous and concave. In  the Appendix, 
we define a further technical condition on utilities that is assumed throughout . The 
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condition, called limited shared weak preference (LSWP) , says that any policy y that is 
weakly preferred to a policy x by all members of a decisive coalition can be approximated 
by policies that all coalition members strictly prefer to x. An implication of LSWP, with 
our other conditions, is that each legislator i has a unique ideal point, denoted x i, that 
is strictly preferred to every other policy, i.e . , ui(x i) > ui(Y) for all y E X \ {x i} .  Many 
familiar environments satisfy LSWP, including the following. 5 
• Classical spatial model /Pure public goods. Policies may have ideological content, 
each Ui is strictly quasi-concave, as when u i(x) = -llx - xiii or ui(x) = -llx -
x i112 . Or, policies may represent levels of public goods provided, each U i  may be 
monotonic with, for example, a Cobb-Douglas form. 
• Public decisions with transfers. The policy space X is a subset of Z x T, where 
Z is a space of public decisions and T � �n is a space of allocations of a district­
specific good, and each U i  is quasi-linear: Ui (z, t) = c/>i(z) + t i, with c/>i strictly 
quasi-concave. 
• Divide the dollar. The policy space is X = { ( x 1 , . . .  , Xn) E �+ I 'E, iEN Xi ::::; 
1 } ,  representing allocations of pork to legislative districts, and U i  ( x) is strictly 
increasing in xi, constant in the consumption of other legislative districts. 
• Local public good economy. Alternatives are allocations of any number of local pub-­
lie goods to districts, where each U i  is strictly quasi-concave and strictly monotonic 
in the consumption of i's district, constant in the consumption of other districts. 
The more familiar condition of strict quasi-concavity is sufficient for LSWP, but it is not 
satisfied in the last three models, which we consider to be of potential importance for 
applications. The last model, in particular, generalizes divide-the-dollar environments 
but has not to our lmowledge been considered in analyses of legislative policy-making. 
We therefore use the weaker LSWP condition. 
Given a collection of decisive coalitions and legislator preferences, we define the core, 
denoted K, as the set of policies that cannot be "overturned" by any decisive coalition. 
Formally, 
the
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sue t at , or i E , U i  y > Ui x 
For a familiar example of the core, let the voting rule 'D be unanimity rule, so that a 
policy x is in the core if and only if there is no policy y such that ui(Y) > ui (x) for every 
legislator i E N, i. e . ,  x is weakly Pareto optimal. In this case, the core is nonempty and 
often quite large. When the set of policies is one-dimensional and 'Dis majority rule, it is 
known that the core is nonempty and consists of the median ideal point, or perhaps the 
5In Banks and Duggan (1999), we prove that LSWP holds in two general models, from which all of 
the examples below can be obtained as special cases. 
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interval between two median ideal points if the number of legislators is even. The core 
has a similar characterization in the general one-dimensional case, as long as the voting 
rule is proper: it is nonempty and consists of the interval between two legislators' ideal 
points.6 In higher dimensional spaces, however, Plott (1967) and others have shown that 
the majority core points must satisfy conditions so restrictive that they would almost 
never be met in reality. Banks (1995) and Saari (1997) extend these results to other 
voting rules that require less than unanimity for passage. Thus , if there are many issue 
dimensions, the core is typically empty for such voting rules . 
Complete information of preferences, the structure of the game form, etc . ,  is assumed 
throughout. A history of length t in the bargaining game describes all that has tran­
spired in the first t periods (who the previous proposers were, what they proposed, how 
legislators voted) , and a strateg y for a legislator is a mapping specifying an intended 
action (what to propose, how to vote) as a function of all histories of all lengths . Since 
our focus in this paper is only on equilibria in stationary strategies ,  we provide a formal 
definition only of such strategies. A (pure) stationary strateg y for legislator i consists of 
a proposal Pi E X, to be offered anytime i is recognized, and a measurable voting rule 
ri: X -+ {accept, reject}. For the latter, we will use the more convenient representation 
of an acceptance set, Ai = ri-1 (accept) , i. e . ,  the set of proposals that i would vote to 
accept .  Given a profile (A1 , ... , An) of acceptance sets and given C � N, define the set 
Ac = n Ai 
iEC 
of proposals acceptable to all members of C, and define the social acceptance set 
A = LJ Ac, 
CE'D 
consisting of proposals that could be passed in any and all periods. 
It turns out that mixtures over proposals are required for our most general existence 
result , so let P (X) denote the set of Borel probability measures on X and endow P (X) 
with the topology of weak convergence.7 Given measurable Y � X, let P (Y) denote 
the subset of Borel probability measures on X that place probability one on Y. Let 
?Ti E P (X) denote a mixed stationary proposal for legislator i ,  and let ?T = (7r1, . . . , ?Tn) 
denote a profile of mixed stationary proposals. A m ixed stationar y strateg y for i is a pair 
O"i = (?Ti, Ai) , and we let O" = ( O" 1, . . .  , O"n) denote a profile of mixed stationary strategies. 
It is important to note that any randomization over proposals takes place before voting: 
the legislators know which policy has been proposed before they cast their votes. 
Informally, a profile O" constitutes a stationary equilibrium if, for every legislator 
i E N, the proposal strategy ?Ti is optimal given the acceptance sets (A1, . . .  , An) of 
the other legislators, and the acceptance set Ai is optimal given that O" describes what 
6See the Appendix for a formal statement. 
7 A sequence {7rk} of probability measures converges weakly to 1f if and only if, for every (bounded) 
continuous function f: X---> !R, we have J f d7rk ---> J f d7r. 
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would happen if the current proposal were rejected. To formalize these conditions, note 
first that any strategy profile O' defines in an obvious (if notationally dense) manner 
a probability distribution over sequences of outcomes and, with it, an expected utility 
Vi( O') for each legislator i E N as evaluated at the beginning of the game. By stationarity, 
this is also i's continuation value throughout the game, i. e . ,  i 's expected utility evaluated 
at the beginning of next period if the current period's proposal is rejected. 
Formally, O' is a stationary equilibrium if two conditions hold. First , we require that 
the legislators' acceptance sets satisfy weak dominance, i.e. , legislator i votes for proposal 
x if and only if the utility from x is at least that of rejecting the proposal and continuing 
to the next period.8 That is, for all i E N, we require that 
This condition eliminates implausible equilibria in which, for instance, under majority 
rule everyone accepts every proposal independently of preferences: the problem in such 
situations is that no one's vote will change the outcome of the game, and hence ev­
eryone's vote is a best response, despite the fact that some legislators may be voting 
for undesirable policies. Note that weak dominance implies q E Ai if /5 = 0. Second, 
we require that the legislators ' proposals satisfy sequential rationality, i .e . ,  legislator i ,  
when recognized as proposer, either chooses utility-maximizing outcomes from within 
A or chooses an outcome that will be rejected, depending on which yields the higher 
payoff. That is, for all i E N, we require that 
rri (argmax{ui(Y) I y E A}) = 1 
when sup{ui(Y) I y E A} > (1 - 8)ui(q) +8vi ( O') ; that 7ri(X \A) = 1 when the inequality 
is reversed;9 and that 7ri place probability one on the union of these two sets when 
equality holds. 
The explicit formula for legislator i 's continuation value, given stationary strategy 
profile O', is straightforward to derive :  it is 
( ) _ 
L,jEN Pj [IA ui(z) rrj(dz) + (1 - 8)rrj(X \ A)ui( q)] vi O' - 1 - /j L,jEN Pj7rj(X \ A) 
. (1) 
Since the discount factor /5 is identical across legislators, we may write each Vi ( O') as the 
expectation of ui with respect to a single probability measure, say v, independent of i .  
This is explicitly defined in the Appendix. Lettingµ denote the point mass on q ,  now 
define the probability measure"/= (1 - 15)µ + 8v , so that the expectation J Uid"/ is just 
(1 - 8)ui (q) + 8vi(O') . Thus, weal( dominance can be written as 
8Baron and Kalai (1993) refer to such strategies as "stage-undominated." 
9Note that, when the inequality is reversed, it follows that X \A =f. 0. 
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That is, legislator i votes for proposals with utility at least equal to i 's  expected utility 
under I. Because I contains all of the relevant information for any legislator to evaluate 
any proposed policy, we refer to I as the continuation distribution corresponding to  CJ'. 
Letting 
x(1) = j z1(dz) 
denote the mean of the continuation distribution, concavity of Ui implies Ui(x(1)) > 
J Uid{. We conclude that, given any profile CJ' satisfying weak dominance, x(1) E A  for 
every legislator i E N. In particular, the social acceptance set A will be nonempty for 
such profiles. 
A stationary equilibrium with delay is a profile CJ' in which, with some positive probar 
bility, a proposal is rejected in the first (or any) period. Formally, this is L:iEN Pi11'i(A) < 
1 .  A no-delay stationary equilibrium is then a profile such that each legislator proposes 
only policies in the acceptance set, i .e. , L:iEN Pi11'i(A) = 1 .  Note that the status quo 
may be the outcome of a no-delay equilibrium, if it is in the social acceptance set and 
it is proposed with positive probability, i .e . ,  if q E A  and 11'i({q}) > 0 for some legislator 
i .  Note also that, in a no-delay equilibrium, legislator i 's continuation value takes the 
especially simple form, 
Vi(O') = L Pj j ui (z) 7rj(dz) ,  
jEN 
(2) 
where the terms in (1) multiplied by 11'i(X\A) disappear, as they correspond to outcomes 
following rejected proposals. 
A static stationary equilibrium is one in which the status quo is maintained with 
probability one, either because no policy is ever passed or because the status quo is the 
only policy passed with positive probability. Formally, these are profiles CJ' such that 
L:iENPi11'i(A \ {q}) = 0 .  Such equilibria might exhibit delay or might not, as when the 
status quo is socially acceptable and all legislators propose it. 
3 Special Cases of the Model 
In this section, we survey some special cases of the bargaining model and provide explicit 
solutions for stationary equilibria. Models 1, 2 ,  and 5 imbed well-known models in the 
infinite-horizon framework with an arbitrary status quo. Other special cases extend the 
theory to new environments, such as the one-dimensional Model 3 ,  where the comparison 
between the equilibria of our model and the predictions of the median voter theorem 
are particularly interesting. While interesting applications in their own right, these 
examples will motivate many of the theoretical results to follow, and they will serve to 
demonstrate the limits of those results as well. 
9 
Model 1: The Romer-Rosenthal model. Let the agenda setter be n with Pn = 1, let 
the number n - 1 of voters be odd, let X � ?R, let the voting rule be DRR, and let each 
ui be quadratic with ideal point Xi, i. e . ,  ui(x) =-Ix - xij2. Let legislator m have the 
median ideal point among N \ {n } ,  and assume Xm < Xn. Though Romer and Rosenthal 
(1978a,b) analyze a static model, i.e . , 8 = 0, we allow any /5 < 1 here. By Lemma 1 of 
Banks and Duggan (2001) , the assumption of quadratic utilities implies that legislator 
m is decisive: x E A if and only if Um(x) ;:::: (1 - 15)um(q) + 8vm(O') in any no-delay 
stationary equilibrium. Thus, legislator n 's proposal Pn must satisfy 
(3) 
in any no-delay equilibrium. Assuming q is close enough to Xm, namely jq - xml < 
lxn-xml, this constraint will be binding: otherwise, since Um(Pn) = vm(O') in equilibrium, 
we would have um(Pn) > um(q), and the agenda setter would do better to propose 
slightly to the right of Pn, contradicting sequential rationality. Thus , when the status 
quo is close to the median legislator, the proposal constraint (3) is indeed binding. Since 
um(Pn) = vm(O') in equilibrium, we must therefore have um(Pn) = um(q). We conclude 
that the unique no-delay stationary equilibrium, independent of the discount factor, is 
such that Pn = Xm + jq - xml , as in Romer and Rosenthal's static model. 
In the above model, the status quo is proposed by the agenda setter if and only 
if it coincides with the core of the voting rule DRR, i. e . ,  q = Xm- In this case, the 
core point is the unique policy outcome. And when the status quo is close to the core, 
the agenda setter n's optimal proposal is close to the core as well. Note that we used 
the assumption of quadratic utilities to derive the same solution in our infinite-horizon 
model as did Romer and Rosenthal (1979a,b) in their static model. If that assumption 
is relaxed, the models will generally have different solutions. 
Model 2: The Krehbiel model. Let n be the executive, let the number n-1 of legislators 
be  odd, let X = [O, 1] ,  let the voting rule be DK, and let each ui be quadratic with ideal 
point Xi. Let legislator m have the median ideal point among N \ {n}, and let Pm= 1 .  
Though Krehbiel (1996, 1998) analyzes a static model, i . e . ,  /5 = 0 ,  we allow any 8 < 1 
here. Assuming the executive's ideal point is greater than those of the legislators , index 
the legislators in increasing order of their ideal points: x1 < x2 < · · · < Xn- Identify the 
legislators v = 2(n - 1 )/3 (the "veto pivot" ) and f = 2(n-1)/5 (the "filibuster pivot" ) .  
(We ignore integer problems here. )  It can be  checked that the core o f  the voting rule DK 
is just [x 1, xv] . In any no-delay stationary equilibrium O', legislator i votes for proposal x 
if and only if ui(x) ;:::: (l - 15) 11.i (q) + 8vi(O'). Letting Pm denote legislator m's equilibrium 
proposal, we argue that it must take the following form. First, we claim that, if q < Xf, 
then 
Pm = min{2x1 - q, Xm}. 
To see why, note that sequential rationality trivially implies q � Pm· Furthermore, 
vi( O') = ui(Pm) for every legislator i E N in any no-delay stationary equilibrium, so i 
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votes for Pm in equilibrium if and only if Ui(Pm) � u;,(q) . Then we must have U J (Pm) � 
u 1 (q) , for otherwise the proposal would not receive the vote of the filibuster pivot f or 
any legislator i ::; f, so less than three fifths of legislators would vote to accept ,  and the 
proposal would fail, a contradiction. An implication is that Pm ::; 2x 1- q. That Pm ::; Xm 
follows from sequential rationality: if Xm <Pm ::; 2x1 - q, then the median legislator 
could propose slightly to the left of Pm, this proposal would still gain the support of 
every legislator i � f and still pass,10 improving the outcome form and contradicting 
sequential rationality. Thus, Pm is no greater than 2x f - q or Xm. If Pm is strictly less 
than the minimum of these two quantities, i. e. ,  Pm< min{2x1 - q, Xm} , then the median 
legislator would do better to propose slightly to the right of Pm, again contradicting 
sequential rationality. This establishes the claim. Second, if q E [x1 , xv] , then we can 
show that Pm = q .  Last, if X v  < q,  then we have 
Pm = max{2xv - q,  Xm} . 
In fact, this is the solution derived by Krehbiel in his static model . Note that ,  as the 
status quo moves from zero to x f, Pm moves from the median toward x Ji for q E [x f, xv], 
Pm equals the status quo; and as the status quo moves from xv to one, Pm moves 
continuously away from xv and toward Xm· 
In the above model, the status quo is not proposed by the median legislator unless 
it is in the core of the voting rule DK. If the status quo does lie in the core, the 
interval [x1, xv] , then it is the median legislator's unique optimal proposal and the unique 
bargaining outcome in every period. This can certainly occur while the status quo 
is distinct from the median legislator's ideal point, i .e . ,  q -=/:- Xm, and in that case a 
majority of legislators would in fact prefer the median ideal point to the bargaining 
outcome, a phenomenon referred to as "gridlock" by Krehbiel (1996, 1998) .  The above 
analysis shows that gridlock either does not occur (a policy other than the status quo is 
proposed by the median legislator and passes) or is complete (the status quo obtains in 
every period) . Finally, note that when the status quo is close to the core, the median 
legislator's optimal proposal is close to the core as well . 
The next model gives our first example of the bargaining approach applied to the 
case of a one-dimensional policy variable. 
Model 3: One dimension) majority rule. Let n be odd, let X = [O, 1] , let each Pi = 
l/n, let D be majority rule, and let each ui be quadratic with ideal point xi . Assume 
x1 < x2 < · · · < xn, and let q::; xm, where m = (n + 1)/2 is the median legislator. We 
look for a no-delay stationary equilibrium of the following form: Pi = Xm -� for all 
i < m, Pm = Xm, and Pi = xi +� for all i > m, where � > 0 is fixed. Let each Ai consist 
of the policies that give legislator i utility at least vi = (1 - b)ui(q) + (<5/n) L,1J=1 ui(Pj) · 
By construction, therefore, wealc dominance will be satisfied. We then need only find 
10The argument that all legislators i 2 f to the right of the filibuster pivot would vote for the 
new proposal uses the fact that, with quadratic utilities, legislator preferences over lotteries are "order 
restricted." This is proved by Cho and Duggan (2002). 
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a value of� consistent with sequential rationality. By Lemma 1 of Banks and Duggan 
(2001) ,  legislator m is decisive: x E A if and only if Um(x) � (1 - 8)um(q) + 8vm. So let 
� satisfy 
Um(Xm -�) = (1 - 8)um(q) + §_ [� Um(Xm -�) + Um(xm) + � Um(Xm + �)] , n i<m i>m 
or, equivalently, 
Solving, we find that 
� 2 - (1 - 8) (xm - q)2 + 
8(n - 1) 
� 2 . 
n 
� = (1 - 8) (xm - q)
2 
1 - 8(n - l)/n · 
For 8 close enough to one or for q close enough to Xm, we have xi < Pi = min A for 
all i < m and max A = Pi < Xi for all i > m, delivering sequential rationality. When 
q = Xm, we have � = 0, so that every legislator proposes the median and it is the 
outcome with probability one. It would then also be an equilibrium for every legislator 
to propose zero while keeping the same acceptance sets as in the latter equilibrium: then 
every proposal will be rejected, so the equilibrium exhibits delay, and the median is still 
the outcome with probability one. 
In the above model , we have found a stationary equilibrium in pure strategies, and 
the equilibrium is no-delay. Furthermore, the core point, Xm, is proposed and passed 
with positive probability, but other proposals may be passed as well . Finally, the social 
acceptance set collapses to the core as legislators become arbitrarily patient or as the 
status quo converges to the core: � ---+ 0 as 8 ---+ 1 or as q ---+ Xm. This illustrates the 
general claims made above that legislative patience leads to moderate outcomes , as do 
moderate status quos. Note also that when the status quo coincides with the legislative 
median , i.e . ,  q = Xm, the social acceptance set collapses to this point, and the core policy 
is selected with probability one. Otherwise, when q =/=- Xm, the status quo is the outcome 
with probability zero. Thus, as in the Romer-Rosenthal and Krehbiel models , the status 
quo is an "all or nothing" proposition. 
Model 4: Two dimensions, core point exists. Let n = 5 ,  X = [-1 ,  1] x [-1 ,  1 ] ,  let each 
Pi =  1/5 , let q = (0, 0) , let 'D b e  majority rule, and let ui (x) = - I Ix - xiii\ with,\� 1 
and ideal points at (0, 0) , (1, 0) , (- 1, 0) , (0, 1) ,  and (0, -1) .  That is, the legislators' ideal 
points are at the center and four corners of a square, and indifference curves are perfect 
circles centered around them. Of course, the unique core point is (0, 0) . We look for a 
no-delay stationary equilibrium of the form Pi = (1 - a)xi for each legislator i, where 
a E (0, 1 ) ,  and i's proposal is accepted by the legislators at the two adjacent corners of 
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the square. In such an equilibrium, legislator i with xi =I= (0, 0) would have continuation 
value 
Letting A consist of the policies x satisfying I Ix - xiW' � (1 - 8) - 8vi , weak dominance 
will be satisfied. We then need only specify a value of a consistent with sequential 
rationality. We do so for the values ,\ = 2, 4. When,\ = 2 ,  it is straightforward to verify 
that a =  1 ,  i. e . ,  Pi = (0, 0) for every legislator i E N, yields a stationary equilibrium: in 
this case, each legislator's continuation value is -1  and each accepts a proposal only if it 
yields a utility at least that of the core point; then the optimal proposal is indeed (0, 0) . 
When ,\ = 4, this is still an equilibrium. It can be checked that a = 0 ,  meaning that 
all legislators propose their own ideal points , is also an equilibrium, as long as 8 � 3/4. 
Consider the proposal of the legislator with ideal point (1 , 0) . She proposes (1 ,  0) , which 
gives the adjacent legislators utility -4. Their continuation values are -58. So given 
our specification of acceptance sets, they accept ( 1 ,  0) if 4 � 1 + 48, which holds if 
8 � 3/4. Thus, (1 , 0) is accepted by a majority and is that legislator's optimal proposal, 
and similarly for the other legislators. 
In the above model, regardless of A, the status quo is proposed by the legislator 
with ideal point at the status quo, which is in the core. In contrast to the q = Xm case 
from Model 3 ,  there may be no-delay equilibria in which other legislators propose other 
policies, even though the status quo is in the core. In contrast with all of the preceding 
models, in the next the core is empty. 
Model 5: The Baron and Ferejohn model with arbitrary status quo. Let n be odd, let 
X = { ( x1 , . . .  , xn) E �+ I L,iEN xi � 1 }  be the unit simplex in �n, let V be majority rule, 
and let ui (x1 , . . .  , xn) = xi . We generalize Baron and Ferejohn (1989) by allowing for 
an arbitrary q E X, whereas they assume q = 0. We will look for a no-delay stationary 
equilibrium such that each legislator offers a positive amount of cake to a randomly 
chosen subset of (n - 1)/2 other legislators, and each legislator's expected payoff from 
rejection is 
1 n 
r = -((1 - 8) (2=qi) + 8) .  n i=l 
(4) 
Also let Si denote the probability that, conditional on not being the proposer, legislator 
i is offered a positive amount of the cake, e .g. ,  Si = 1/2 if all proposers randomize 
uniformly over subsets of legislators. In such an equilibrium, if i offers a positive amount 
of cake to another legislator, that amount will simply be r. Thus, the optimal payoff to 
a legislator i when selected to propose will be 
( n - 1 ) 
1 - r  -
2
- , 
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reflecting the fact that i offers r to (n - 1)/2 others and keeps the rest of the cake. 
Legislator i's continuation value in such an equilibrium would be 
reflecting the fact that, when someone else proposes, i is offered the amount r with 
probability Si. Then i 's  payoff from rejecting a proposal is 
Setting this equal tor and solving for Si, we have 
(5) 
For the case qi = 7j E [O, l/n ] for all i E N, so the legislators have equal consumption 7j 
of the cake in the status quo, and each Pi = l/n, we then have Si= 1/2 and 
6 r = (1 - 6)q + -. 
n 
Thus, a subset of ( n - l) /2 non-proposers is chosen at random with each member offered 
r, defined above, while the proposer keeps 1 - r (n - 1)/2, or equivalently, 
(1 - o) (n - l) q o(n - 1) 
l - 2 
+ 
2n · 
Setting 7j = 0 ,  as in Baron and Ferejohn (1989) , non-proposers are offered r = 6/n 
and the proposer keeps 1 - 6 (n - 1)/2n .  Setting q = l/n, so the legislators split the 
cake evenly in the status quo, non-proposers are offered l/n and the proposer keeps 
(n + 1)/2n . Thus, increasing the status quo q decreases the rent of the proposer. If the 
recognition probabilities are close to l/n and the status quo is close to q = ( q ,  . . . , q) , 
then the probability that i is offered a positive amount of the cake is given by (5) , and 
the amount of the offer is given by (4) . The probabilities in (5) correspond to stationary 
equilibria whenever Si E [O, 1] for each i . 1 1 Assuming L:f=1 qi = 1, so the status quo is 
11 A caveat is that Si is the "marginal" probability on i being offered a positive amount of cake, derived 
from a distribution on subsets of size ( n - 1) /2. Given an arbitrary ( s1, ... , sn) , there is the question 
of whether these marginal probabilities can be derived from such a distribution. A necessary condition 
is that I: Si = n/2, a condition satisfied by (5) when each Pi= l/n. The condition is sufficient when 
n = 3 ,  but we leave the question of the general case open. 
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Pareto efficient, the conditions for this are as follows. When qi 2:: l/n, then Si � 0 if 
and only if 
2 
and 
2(nqi - 1) < 8 
2 - Pi ( n + 1 )  1 - 8 ' 
Pi < n + l  
and Si:::; 1 is not binding. When qi:::; l/n, then Si� 0 if and only if either Pi 
< 2/(n+ 1) 
or 
Pi > 
and si :::; 1 if and only if 
2 
and 
2(nqi - 1) > 8 
n + l  2 - Pi ( n + 1 )  1 - 8 ' 
2(nqi - 1) < 
n - l  
When Pi = qi = l/n, as mentioned above, si = 1/2 E [O, 1] and the above conditions 
hold for all 8. An implication is that we do not have equilibria of the conjectured form 
in certain cases , e.g . ,  when qi > l/n and Pi is too high, or when qi > l/n, Pi is low, but 
8 is too low. In the latter cases, there is no way to bring i 's expected payoff of rejection 
down to r, and, in equilibrium, i will never be offered a positive amount of the cake. 
In the next model, the core  is also empty, but bargaining takes place in a spatial 
environment similar to that of Baron (1991 ) ,  with the important difference that legis­
lators are not perfectly patient and the status quo now belongs to the policy space. In 
contrast to the preceding models, mixed proposal strategies play an important role in 
our analysis . 
Model 6: Two dimensions, no core point. Let n = 3, let X be the unit simplex in a?3, 
let each Pi = 1/3, let q be on an edge of the simplex, let D be majority rule, and let 
Ui (x) = u(-llx - xii I) for each i, where u( ·) is a strictly increasing, concave function 
and the ideal points are at the vertices of the simplex . Specifically, let x1 = ( 1 ,  0, 0) , 
x2 = (0, 1 ,  0) ,  and x3 = (0, 0 ,  1 ) .  Without loss of generality, assume q is between x1 and 
x2 , with 
as in Figure 1 .  Define 
u' = u(Jlx1 - qll) , u" = u(llx2 - qJI ) , u"' = u(llx3 - qll) , 
and note that u' > u" > v!". For use later, let 
r = 
u" - u"' 
u' - u" · 
Let a2 = q, and let a 3 be  the point on the edge between x1 and x3 that is the same 
distance as q from x1 , i.e. ' 
a3 xi + 
llq11 ll (-l, O, l) . 
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Let b1 be the point on the edge between x2 and x1 that is the same distance, I lq - x111, 
from x2; let b3 be the point on the edge between x2 and x3 that is liq - x111 from x2. 
And let c1 and c2 be between x3 and, respectively, x1 and x2, both a distance of I lq- x1 11 
from x3. See Figure 1. 
[ Figure 1 about here. ] 
We will look for a no-delay stationary equilibrium in which legislator 1 proposes a2 to 
legislator 2 and a3 to legislator 3, 2 proposes b1 to 1 and b3 to 3, and 3 proposes c1 
to 1 and c to 2 .  Denote the probability that 1 proposes to i = 2 ,  3 by ai; denote the 
probability that 2 proposes to i = 1, 3 by /3i; and denote the probability that 3 proposes 
to i = 1 ,  2 by 'Yi · In such an equilibrium, the legislators' continuation values would be 
8 
Vi 3 [u' + (/31 + 'Yi)u" + ((33 + 'Y2 )u" 1 
8 
V2 3 [u' + ( a2 + 'Y2)u" + ( a3 + 'Yi)u111] 
8 
V3 3[u' + (a3 + f32)u" + (a2 + f31)u111] .  
Imposing weak dominance, the proposals c1 and c2 are optimal for legislator 3 if they 
give 1 and 2 exactly their expected payoffs of rejecting the proposal ,  i.e. ,  c1 must give 1 
a payoff of ( 1 - 8)v! + 8v1 , and c2 must give 2 a payoff of ( 1 - 8)u" + 8v2• Since c1 gives 
1 a payoff of u" , we must have 
or equivalently, 
u" -
(3 - 28)u' + 8((33 + "(2)u111 
3 - 8((31 + "(1 ) 
This condition will hold when the proposal probabilities satisfy 
(6) 
Since b1 also gives 1 a payoff of u" , this condition also ensures that 2 cannot find a 
better policy to propose to 1 .  Similarly, c2 and a2 give 2 a payoff of u" if the proposal 
probabilities satisfy 
Finally, a3 and b3 give 3 a payoff of u" if 
1 
r 
3r 
1 + 3r - 5. 
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(7) 
(8) 
We have left to find conditions on the primitives of our model under which there exist 
proposal probabilities satisfying (6), (7), (8), and the usual contraints : 
a2 + a3 = l, /3i + fJ3 = l, 11 + 12 = 1, 
and non-negativity. Solutions to this problem will yield mixed proposal strategies satis­
fying sequential rationality and, hence, no-delay stationary equilibria. See Figure 2 for 
a visual illustration of the legislators' acceptance sets and optimal proposals. 
[ Figure 2 about here. ] 
It can be checked that, if r _::::: 1, then solutions exist if and only if 
3r2 
1 + 3r2 ' 
in which case /2 _::::: a3 > fJ1. If r ::; 1, then solutions exist if and only if 
3 
8 > -­- 3 + r' 
in which case a3 _::::: 12 > fJ1 . Thus, given any location of the status quo, and with it r, 
there exists a no-delay stationary equilibrium of the conjectured form if the legislators 
are sufficiently patient. These restrictions on the discount factor are wealrnst when 
r = 1.12 In that case, it is necessary and sufficient that 8 _::::: 3/4 , and then equilibria are 
characterized by 
When r = 1 and 8 = 3/4, the minimum possible discount factor, it follows that a3 = 
12 = 1 and (J1 = 0 .  If 8 is higher, there will be a range of mixed strategy equilibria: 
when 8 = 6/7, for example, one equilibrium will be a3 = 12 = .65 and fJ1 = . 15 .  
In the above model, as in Model 4 ,  the status quo can be proposed with probability 
strictly between zero and one in equilibrium, as when r = 1 and 8 = 6/7: in this case, 
we have demonstrated an equilibrium in which a2 = 1 - a3 = .35 . And, though we 
have found a mixed strategy equilibrium in this case, there do not exist pure strategy 
equilibria of the conjectured form nor, to our knowledge, any other. 
In contrast to the preceding models, the next admits a stationary equilibrium in 
which delay occurs with positive probability. Note that the legislators in this model are 
risk neutral. 
Model 7: An equilibrium with delay. Let n = 3 ,  X = [O, 1] , each Pi = 1/3, q = 0, 
let 'D be majority rule, u1(x) = 1 - x ,  and u2(x) = u3(x) = x. These utility functions 
12For a point of reference, it can be checked that, for the case ui (x) = - llxi - xii, we haver= 1 if 
t he dis tance between x1 and the status quo is Ji!
1
. 
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are concave and strictly quasi-concave but linear. It can be checked that there exists a 
no-delay stationary equilibrium here, but we look for a stationary equilibrium with delay 
of the following form: P1 = 0 ,  Ai = [O, x (t)] , p2 = p3 = 1, and A2 = A3 = [x(!) , 1] . 
Using the expression for I in the Appendix, we have 
Thus, 
1( {O}) 1 - 8 + 8 
(pi(l - o) ) 
1 - 8p1 
i({l}) - o
(P2 + p3) . 
l - 8p1 
x (I) = 8 
( P2 + p3) . 
1 - 8p1 
By risk neutrality, the acceptance sets so-defined satisfy weak dominance, and proposal 
strategies clearly satisfy sequential rationality. But, because legislator 1 's proposal is 
rejected and the other legislators propose a socially acceptable policy distinct from the 
status quo, this equilibrium exhibits delay: with probability p1 > 0, the status quo q = 0 
will be obtained for a finite number of periods and be replaced by x = 1. Note that 
equilibrium delay would not be possible given these three legislators if we let just one, 
say legislator 2 ,  have a strictly concave utility function: then legislator 1 could offer 2 a 
policy slightly to the left of x(t) , and this would pass.13 
Finally, we turn to a model in which the legislators use a supermajority voting rule to 
choose from a two-dimensional policy space. Recall that in Models 1-3 , when the status 
quo was in the core, it was the only possible bargaining outcome. In Model 4, when the 
status quo was at (0, 0) ,  the core point, it was proposed by at least one legislator, but 
others could propose other policies. In contrast , in the next model the status quo is in 
the core, yet it is proposed by no legislator . Moreover, the status quo is not even in the 
social acceptance set . 
Model 8: An equilibrium in which the s tatus quo lies in the core but is not socially 
acceptable. Let n = 5, let X � �2 with status quo q as in Figure 3 ,  and let each 
Pi = 1/5. Define the supermajority voting rule 1J so that four or more votes are required 
for passage: 1J = {C �NI ICI � 4} . Let the utility functions Ui have ideal points and 
circular indifference curves as in Figure 3. 
[ Figure 3 about here. ] 
Let legislator 1 mix over x and y with equal probabilities, and let each legislator i = 
2, 3 ,  4, 5 propose Pi, as in Figure 3 .  We further specify utilities as follows. Defining 
Vi = Ui(x) � Ui(Y) + � t Ui(Pj) 
J=2 
13But if we replicate these legislators one time, for a total of six, and if we let just legislator 2 have a 
strictly concave utility function, then we still have delay: a proposal slightly to the left of x(!) would 
garner only three votes and would fail. 
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for each legislator, we require 
u1 (p3) 
u2 (x) 
u3(y) 
u4 (x) 
us(Y) 
u1 (p4) = (1 - 8)u1 (q) + 8v1 
(1 - 8)u2( q) + 8v2 
u3(ps ) = u3(p4) = ( 1 - 8)u3(q) + 8v3 
u4 (P2 ) = u4(p3) = ( 1 - 8)u4(q) + 8v4 
( 1 - 8)us(q) + 8vs . 
It is clear that this is consistent with our assumption that utilities be  concave. Letting 
A consist of policies x such that ui(x) ?: (1 - 8)ui (q) + 8vi, weak dominance is satisfied, 
and it is then clear from Figure 3 that sequential rationality is satisfied as well. Here, 
the core is the shaded polygon and contains the status quo, yet legislators 1 ,  2, and 5 
would vote against the status quo if it were proposed. 
4 G eneral Resu lts on Legislative Bargaining 
4 . 1  Existence of Stationary Equilibria 
In this subsection, we address two theoretical issues of fundamental importance for the 
applicability of the model described in the previous sections, namely, the existence and 
continuity properties of stationary equilibria. In each of the models of the previous 
section, a no-delay stationary equilibrium exists. Our first theorem establishes existence 
of no-delay stationary equilibria as a general result, despite the possibility that the status 
quo is favorable to some legislators. 
Theorem 1 There exists a no-de lay stationary equilibrium. 
A further desirable property of equilibria is uniqueness. As Model 4 demonstrates, 
however, there may be multiple no-delay stationary equilibria, and in fact these need 
not even be payoff-equivalent. Cho and Duggan (2002) provide a one-dimensional ex­
ample with multiple stationary equilibria that are not payoff equivalent , so it is known 
that no general uniqueness result is available.14 The above existence proof uses mixed 
proposal strategies because, given stationary strategies for the other legislators, the set 
of proposals optimal for a legislator need not be  convex. This possible non-convexity 
may arise because the set of socially acceptable proposals may itself be non-convex, as 
in Model 6 .  Thus, as in the theory of Nash equilibrium, mixing serves an important 
technical role in establishing existence of stationary equilibria. 
14Cho and Duggan (2002) prove that there is exactly one no-delay stationary equilibrium under the 
assumption of quadratic utilities. More generally, they prove that the social acceptance sets of no-delay 
stationary equilibria are nested, and that the minimal and maximal equilibria are unique. 
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In the one-dimensional Models 1 ,  2, and 3, however, we found only pure strategy 
equilibria. The next theorem establishes this as a general result for one-dimensional 
policy spaces. In fact, the result holds with no limit on the number of issues for a 
restricted class of voting rules. We say the voting rule 1J is oligarchic if there is a 
nonempty coalition C � N of legislators that is decisive and is contained in every other 
decisive coalition, i.e. , 1J = { C' � N I C � C'} . This class of rules does not include 
majority rule, but it does contain the interesting case of unanimity rule. As another 
example, consider a majoritarian parliament where bargaining takes place among parties, 
which have weights in proportion to their size; if there is one party with more than half 
of the seats, then the voting rule is oligarchic. 
Theorem 2 Assume either d = 1 or the voting rule 1J is oligarchic. Every no-delay 
stationary equilibrium is in pure strategies. 
This result simplifies the analysis of the bargaining model in a variety of environ­
ments, where we only need to work with pure proposal strategies, which are more 
tractable than mixed strategies. That Theorem 2 does not hold in multiple dimensions 
is demonstrated in Models 5 and 6 ,  where we have found mixed strategy equilibria. In 
multidimensional settings, we do not know whether pure strategy equilibria always exist , 
but, in the latter model, there failed to exist pure strategy equilibria of a simple form 
for some parameter values. We conjecture that, for those values , the only equilibria are 
mixed and that mixing is needed for our general existence result . 
We next take up the issue of equilibrium continuity. The stationary equilibria of our 
model are parameterized by the legislators ' recognition probabilities, p = (p1 , . . . , Pn) E 
..6. (the unit simplex in �n) ,  the status quo, q E X, and the discount factor, 8 E [O, 1).  
To these we add information about utility functions: let A C �k be a set parameterizing 
profiles of utility functions , so the legislators' preferences can be represented as ui(x) = 
ui (x, A) for some A E A. Assume that each ui is jointly continuous in (x, A) , that each 
ui( · ,  A) is concave in x, and that LSWP is satisfied for all A E A. As examples of such 
parameterizations, we could have A � �nd and A = (A1, . . .  , An) E A,  with each Ai 
representing the ideal point of a quadratic utility function for legislator i .  Or, more 
generally, Ai might be the matrix defining weighted Euclidean distance utilities (see 
Hinich and Munger, 1997). For paranrnters p, q, 8, and A, let E(p, q, 8, A) denote the set 
of no-delay stationary equilibrium mixed proposal profiles . Our next result formalizes 
the idea that "small" variations in (p, q, 8, A) cannot lead the set E(p, q, 8, A) of no-delay 
stationary equilibria to "blow up ." 15 
Theorem 3 The correspondence E of no-delay stationary equilibria is upper hemicon­
tinuous in the parameters of the model. 
This continuity of the no-delay stationary equilibrium proposal strategies is familiar 
from the Romer-Rosenthal model (Model 1 ) ,  where the agenda setter's proposal Pn = 
15See the Appendix for a formal definition of upper hemicontinuity. 
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Xm + lq - xml is clearly continuous in q. Moreover, because there is a unique no-delay 
stationary equilibrium when Pn = 1, no-delay stationary equilibrium proposals will be 
close to this when Pn is close to one or when utility functions are close to quadratic. In the 
Krehbiel model (Model 2) ,  continuity of the median's proposal with respect to the status 
quo is also apparent . And, because there is a unique no-delay stationary equilibrium 
when Pm = 1 ,  no-delay stationary equilibrium proposals will be close to this when Pm 
is close to one or when utilities are close to quadratic. Continuity is also demonstrated 
in Model 3 ,  where D.. is a continuous function of the discount factor, the median voter's 
ideal point, and the status quo. Similarly, continuity is exhibited in Model 5 ,  where the 
probability of being offered a positive amount of cake and the amount of the offer are 
continuous in the parameters of the model. 
That Theorem 3 does not extend to all stationary equilibria, including those with 
delay, can be seen from Model 7. There, we found a stationary equilibrium in which 
legislator 1 proposes Pl = 0, which is rejected. Indeed, we could have specified any 
p1 E [O, x(i) ) ,  as all of these proposal would also be rejected. However, fixing the 
others' strategies, Pl = x(!) does not constitute a stationary equilibrium. The reason 
is that this proposal would be accepted, increasing the continuation values of legislators 
2 and 3 discontinuously, and then the acceptance sets A2 = A3 = x(!) would no longer 
satisfy weak dominance. We conclude that the set of all stationary equilibrium proposal 
strategies is not even closed-valued, let alone closed graph. 
4 . 2  Stability of the Status Quo 
We now turn to the issue of stability of the status quo in the stationary equilibria of our 
bargaining model and, in particular , the possibility of delay. We have already established 
the existence of equilibria without delay, but Theorem 1 leaves open the possibility that 
there are other equilibria in which some proposals are rejected. This is an especially 
interesting issue because delay is difficult to explain in models of complete information, 
and because it is an empirically verifiable aspect of the bargaining process. Recall that, 
of the special cases with strictly concave utilities, the only equilibrium with delay were 
in Model 3 ,  where the status quo was at the median and there was a static equilibrium 
in which every proposal was rejected. Our next theorem establishes this as a general 
result: if legislators put any positive weight on the future and if utility functions are 
strictly concave, then every stationary equilibrium is either no-delay or static. Thus, the 
outcome of bargaining in the first period will be the outcome in every period, whether 
it is the status quo or some other policy immediately agreed upon. 
As stated above, this result applies to the classical spatial model, but not to environ­
ments with a district-specific good, such as divide-the-dollar environments and local pub­
lic good economies, where strict concavity is generally violated. In the Baron-Ferejohn 
model , however, we again found no equilibria with delay. We extend this observation 
to environments in which the sum of utilities is strictly concave and in which limited 
transfers are possible. We say the condition of limited transferability is satisfied if, for 
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every policy x E X  and every legislator i E N, ui(x) > min{ui (Y) I y E X} implies there 
is a policy z E X such that, for every other legislator j =/:- i, we have uj (z) > uj(x) .  
The idea is that we can take goods away from legislator i and spread them across the 
remaining legislative districts, making those legislators better off. This is clearly possible 
in local public good economies, and the sum of utilities will also be strictly concave if 
every legislator's utility is strictly concave in her own district's consumption. 
Theorem 4 Assume 8 > 0 .  Also assume that there is a decisive coalition C all the 
members of which have strictly concave utility functions, i. e ., Ui is strictly concave for 
all i E C, or that the sum of utilities L,iEN Ui is strictly concave and limited transferability 
is satisfied. Every stationary equilibrium is either no-delay or static. 
Equivalently, every stationary equilibrium with delay is static. An important impli­
cation of Model 7 is that the assumption of strict concavity in Theorem 4 cannot be 
dropped completely: there we found an equilibrium in which delay occurs with positive 
probability and yet the status quo is eventually replaced by another policy with probar 
bility one. This shows that an interesting form of delay can be obtained in our model, 
but that the role of risk neutrality was crucial in that example. That a positive discount 
factor is needed for Theorem 4 can be seen by modifying Model 3 with Xm-l < q < Xm 
and 8 = 0. In the equilibrium found there, legislator m - 1 proposes q ,  but having m - 1 
propose 2xm - q is also a stationary equilibrium: because 8 = 0 ,  this change does not 
affect continuation values or acceptance sets, and legislator m - 1 is indifferent between 
that proposal and q, the optimal choice from within the social acceptance set. 
We now consider the possibility that in equilibrium all legislators propose the same 
policy, meaning that there is no ex ante uncertainty about the outcome of bargaining. 
In Models 3 and 4 ,  we saw only two instances of such equilibria: in Model 3 with 
q = Xm and in Model 4 ,  with every legislator proposing q = (0, 0 ) .  In both cases the 
equilibrium was static. Our next theorem shows that this connection holds generally 
and that the conditions required for this coincidence of proposals are quite restrictive: 
unless all legislators have the same ideal point, an equilibrium must be static. 
Theorem 5 Assume that at least two legislators have distinct ideal points . If O' is a 
no-delay stationary equilibrium in which every legislator proposes the same policy, i. e. , 
there exists x E X  such that 7ri ( {x}) = 1 for all i E N, then O' is static. 
Thus, delay (assuming 8 > 0) and coincidence of proposals (assuming at least two 
legislators have distinct ideal points) each imply a stationary equilibrium is static: the 
status quo obtains with probability one in every period. How restrictive is this conclu­
sion? We saw static equilibria in Models 3 and 4 ,  but only when the status quo was 
in the core. Our next result establishes this as a general necessary and sufficient condi­
tion for existence of a static equilibrium, under a very weak restriction on recognition 
probabilities . 
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Theorem 6 Assume that every decisive coalition has positive recognition probability, 
i. e. , L,iEC Pi > 0 for all C E 'D. There exists a static stationary equilibrium if and only 
if the status quo is in the core, i. e . ,  q E K. 
The possibility of delay or coincidence of proposals therefore hinges on the possibility 
that the status quo lies in the core, under quite weak conditions. When all legislators 
have the same ideal point, contrary to the assumptions of Theorem 6, it is easy to 
construct a stationary equilibrium exhibiting coincidence of proposals that is not static: 
every legislator simply proposes the ideal point and votes for it .  Except in that case, 
however, Theorems 5 and 6 establish very general conditions under which delay and 
coincidence of proposals each imply that the status quo is in the core. In particular, 
they are possible only if the core is non-empty, a knife-edge condition for majority rule 
when there are multiple issue dimensions. The next corollary on the possibility of delay 
follows directly from the above results. 
Corollary 1 Assume that 8 > 0, that Pi > 0 for every legislator i E N, and that the 
status quo is not in the core, i. e . , q � K. If each Ui is strictly concave, then there are 
no stationary equilibria with delay. 
The corollary is most relevant for higher dimensional issue spaces and voting rules 
such as majority rule, for then the core is almost always empty. Our results have an 
even starker consequence when transfers are possible, for then, for most voting rules of 
interest, the core is always empty. We say the voting rule 'D is non-collegial if there is no 
legislator in every decisive coalition, i .e . ,  ncEv C  = 0 .  This is clearly true for majority 
rule and any supermajority rule short of unanimity. 
Corollary 2 Assume that 8 > 0, that Pi > 0 for every legislator i E N, and that 'D is 
non-collegial. If the sum of utilities L,iEN ui is strictly concave and limited tmnsferability 
is satisfied, then there are no stationary equilibria with delay. 
Of course, similar corollaries hold for the possibility that all legislators propose the 
same policy. We conclude that, for a very wide class of models, it will almost always be 
the case that at least two legislators propose different policies with positive probability 
and that the first proposal will pass. 
4 . 3  Core Selection 
Theorem 6 yields a general condition under which there exists at least one stationary 
equilibrium that selects from the core with probability one: it is sufficient that the status 
quo lies in the core .  In this subsection, we strengthen this result significantly by showing 
that, in many environments, if the status quo lies in the core, then it is the outcome of 
every stationary equilibrium. Thus, for the case of majority rule, bargaining equilibria 
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always select from the set of medians, providing a game-theoretic foundation for the 
well-known median voter theorem. Our result applies to very general voting rules when 
the policy space is one-dimensional and to the comparatively limited class of oligarchic 
voting rules when there are multiple issue dimensions. 
Theorem 7 Assume that Pi > 0 for every legislator i E N. Also assume that d = 1 
and 'D is proper or that 'D is oligarchic. For every no-delay stationary equilibrium (}", 
the following implications hold. 
(i) A = {q} {::} (ii) q E K  =? (iii) q E A. 
Moreover, if 8 > 0, then (iii) =? (ii) . 
The implication (iii) ::::} (ii) shows that, if legislators put any positive weight on the 
future and the status quo is not in the core (q � K), then the status quo lies outside 
the social acceptance set ( q � A) . Thus, no legislator proposes the status quo in any 
no-delay stationary equilibrium. If voting is by unanimity rule ,  so that the core is the 
set of Pareto optimal policies,  then this simply means that no legislator would propose a 
Pareto-dominated status quo. Under majority rule, however, it means that no legislator 
will propose the status quo if it lies outside the interval of medians, which of course 
may be quite small. That 8 > 0 is needed for the result can be  seen from Model 3 by 
setting 8 = 0: then legislator 1 proposes p1 = q E A. That the result holds only in one 
dimension can be seen from Model 6, where the core is empty, yet legislator 1 proposes 
the status quo, which is in the social acceptance set. 
By implication (ii) ::::} ( i) , if the status quo is in the core, then it is the only socially 
acceptable policy, and so it is the only possible proposal in a no-delay equilibrium. 
Adding Theorems 4 and 6, it will therefore be the only possible outcome of any stationary 
equilibrium, with or without delay. Thus, if the policy space is one-dimensional or 
the voting rule is oligarchic, and if the status quo is in the core, then the outcome of 
bargaining necessarily lies in the core. If voting is by unanimity rule, this means that a 
Pareto optimal status quo will necessarily be the unique policy outcome. For majority 
rule in one dimension, this generalizes the conclusion from Model 3 ,  where q = Xm 
implied that every legislator proposes Xm, the unique equilibrium outcome. That the 
result does not hold generally in more than one dimension can be seen from Model 4 
with >. = 4,  where the status quo is in the core but is only proposed by one legislator. 
In fact, even the weaker implication (ii) ::::} (iii) does not hold generally: Model 8 shows 
that, if we omit both the assumption of a single policy dimension and the assumption 
that the voting rule is oligarchic, then the status quo may be in the core yet lie outside 
the social acceptance set . 
This "core selection" result is related to the issue of "core equivalence," addressed in 
Banks and Duggan (2000) . There, we show that, assuming perfectly patient legislators 
(8 = 1 ) ,  the stationary equilibrium outcomes coincide with the core when either the 
policy space is one-dimensional or the voting rule lies in a restricted class. That result 
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differs from from Theorem 7 in several ways. First, the core equivalence result of Banks 
and Duggan (2000) gives conditions under which every core policy can be supported as 
an equilibrium outcome, whereas we are presently selecting just one core policy, namely, 
the status quo. Second, the restriction on voting rules used for the multidimensional 
case in that paper is somewhat weaker than requiring v be oligarchic. Third, that 
paper relies on perfect patience, whereas we presently allow any discount factor . In 
fact, because of the assumption of a bad status quo in that paper, core equivalence 
is impossible there when the discount factor is strictly less than one. Lastly, our core 
selection result applies only when the status quo is in the core, a condition that cannot 
even be formulated in a model with a bad status quo. 
An easy implication of our core selection result in Theorem 7, with the continuity 
result of Theorem 3, is the following comparative static on the status quo: as in Model 
3, when the status quo is close to the core, the proposals of the legislators will be also 
be close to the core in every no-delay stationary equilibrium. In other words, moderate 
status quos lead to moderate equilibrium policy outcomes. Given a set Y ,:;  X and a 
policy x, let d(Y, x) = sup{ d(x, y) 1 y E Y} measure the distance from Y to x, where 
d(x, y) is the usual Euclidean distance. Thus , d(Ak, q) _, 0 in the next theorem implies 
that social acceptance sets collapse to a single core point. 
Theorem 8 Assume that Pi > 0 for every legislator i E N. Also assume that d = 1 
and v is proper or that v is oligarchic . Let qk ___, q E K, and let { CJk} be a correspond­
ing sequence of no-delay stationary equilibria with social acceptance sets { A  k} . Then 
d(Ak, q) __, 0 .  
By Theorems 5 and 6 ,  we know that, unless the status quo is in the core, stationary 
equilibrium proposals will not be concentrated on any one core point. As a consequence, 
if q ./ K and there is only one core point (as in Model 3) , then some non-core policies are 
necessarily proposed. The next result shows, however, that in many environments there 
will always be at least one core policy proposed and passed with positive probability. 
This gives us a weaker core selection result: in every stationary equilibrium, a core policy 
will be realized with positive probability. 
Theorem 9 Assume that d = 1 and v is proper or that v is oligarchic . In every no­
delay stationary equilibrium CJ1 some legislator proposes a policy in the core, i. e ., Pi E K 
for some i E N. 
We saw no-delay stationary equilibria with non-core proposals in Model 3 when the 
status quo was outside the core, i. e . ,  q 'F Xm. We also saw, however, that these proposals 
converged to the core as the discount factor approached one. The next result establishes 
this result as a general theorem, yielding an ''asymptotic core selection" result as the 
discount factor approaches one, regardless of the location of the status quo. The result 
applies to very general voting rules when the policy space is one-dimensional , and it holds 
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for a class containing the oligarchic rules when there are multiple issue dimensions. We 
say a voting rule is collegial if there is at least one legislator who belongs to every decisive 
coalition, i .e . ,  ncE'D c =I= 0 .  This class includes all oligarchic voting rules, including 
unanimity rule. Given sets Y, Z � X, we let D(Y, Z) = inf{d(Y, z) J z E Z} measure 
the distance from Y to Z. Thus, the convergence result stated next, that D (Ak , K) --+ 0, 
means that socially acceptable policies must be arbitrarily close to core policies as the 
discount factor approaches one. 
Theorem 10 Assume that Pi > 0 for every legislator i  E N. Also assume that d = 1 and 
1J is proper or that 1> is collegial. Let ()k --+ 1, and let { O"k} be a corresponding sequence 
of no-delay stationary equilibria with social acceptance s ets {Ak} .  Then D(Ak , K) --+ 0 .  
In other words, legislative patience necessarily leads t o  moderate equilibrium policy 
outcomes. The implications of Theorem 10 are strongest when the core is a small set. If 
the voting rule 1> is majority rule with an odd number of legislators, for example, then 
the core consists of the unique median ideal point of the legislators, and in that case 
the stationary equilibrium outcomes of our bargaining model approach the prediction 
of the median voter theorem as legislators exhibit greater patience. Though we do not 
model the elections that produce legislative policy-malrnrs, this result has an interesting 
implication for the design of electoral institutions : if we view legislator utility functions 
as representative of their districts, and if we view the discount factor of a legislator 
as corresponding to the probability of reelection, then systems that offer a sufficient 
incumbency advantage will lead to moderate policies. 
5 Conclusion 
This paper contributes a general model of legislative bargaining in which the status quo 
is an arbitrary point in a multidimensional policy space. In contrast to other bargaining 
models, the status quo is not assumed to be "bad," and delay may be Pareto efficient. 
And in contrast to the social choice approach, where the existence of core policies in 
multiple dimensions is a significant problem, we prove existence of no-delay stationary 
equilibria for any number of issue dimensions. We have investigated the conditions under 
which delay is possible and found that, for the environments most interesting in policy­
making applications, delay will almost never occur. Finally, we have given sufficient 
conditions for "core selection, " the event that stationary equilibrium outcomes always lie 
in the core, and we have provided results on asymptotic core selection. Importantly, we 
have found that moderate status quos lead to moderat e  policy outcomes, and legislative 
patience also leads to moderation. While we have considered mainly foundational issues 
here, we have proposed a general framework in which more substantive questions, about 
the nature of public goods provided or the coalitions that form to pass proposals, for 
example, can be  taken up in special cases with more structure. 
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A Techni cal Matters 
To define LSWP, we denote i 's weak and strict upper contour sets at x, respectively, by 
and we let 
R;,(x) {y E X  I ui(Y) � ui(x)} 
Pi(x) {y E X I ui(Y)  > ui(x)} ,  
Rc(x) = n R;,(x) and R(x) = LJ Rc(x) ,  
iEC CE'D 
with similar conventions used for P0(x) and P(x) .  That is, R0(x) consists of the policies 
that every member of C weakly prefers to x, and R(x) consists of the policies weakly 
preferred to x by all members of some decisive coalition, with similar interpretations of 
Pc(x) and P(x). Given Y � X, let Y denote the closure of Y.  Then limited shared 
weak preference is satisfied if, for all C � N and all x E X, 
IRc(x) I > 1 implies Rc(x) � Pc(x) .  
That is, if y (distinct from x )  is wealdy preferred t o  x by all members o f  a coalition 
C, then it can be approximated by policies that all members of C strictly prefer to x. 
We have given sufficient conditions for LSWP in Section 2 .  To see why strict quasi­
concavity implies LSWP, for example, suppose all members of coalition C weakly prefer 
some policy y to x =/= y .  Then every convex combination of x and y (with positive weight 
on both) is strictly preferred to x by all members of C.  Letting the weight on y go to 
one, we approximate y by policies in P0(x) ,  as required. Note that, with concavity, 
LSWP implies strict quasi-concavity when d = 1 .  
The characterization of  the core in one-dimensional environments is well-known (cf. 
Austen-Smith and Banks , 1999) . Let .x. be the lowest ideal point,  subject to the constraint 
that the legislators to the right are not decisive, i .e . ,  C1 = { i E N I xi > .x.} � 'D, and 
let x be the greatest ideal point subject to the constraint that the legislators to the left 
are not decisive, i.e. , C2 = { i E N I Xi < x} � 'D. Then K = [.x., x] , which is nonempty 
as long as 'D is proper. 
Given a stationary strategy profile (}' ,  the probability measure v is defined as follows: 
given measurable Y � X, 
( ) _ L,jEN Pi f'n"j(Y n A) + Jy (q) (l - o)wi (X \ A)] v Y - , 
1 - 6 L,jEN pj7rj(X \ A) 
where Jy(q) is the indicator fm1ction that takes value one if q E Y and zero otherwise. 
The continuation distribution, "f, is then defined as 'Y(Y) = (1 - o)µ(Y) + 8v(Y) ,  where 
µ is the point mass on q .  
Finally, in the following proofs, we refer to a subset G � X as open if it  is  open in 
the relative topology, i . e . ,  if there is an open subset G' of � such that G = X n G'. 
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Theorem 1 There exists a no-delay stationary equilibrium. 
Proof: To prove existence, let 7r denote a profile of mixed proposal strategies, and define 
which would be i 's  continuation value if each 7rj put probability one on socially acceptable 
proposals. Note that, since Ui is continuous, Vi (7r) is continuous in the weak topology 
on [7-'(X)in . For all i E N, define 
A(7r) = {x E X I  Ui(x) � (1 - 8)Ui(q) + 8vi(1f )} ,  
and, following our earlier conventions, let 
Letting 'Y denote the continuation distribution corresponding to the stat ionary strategy 
profile CJ" =  ((7r1 , A1 (7r)) ,  . . .  , (7rn , An (7r))) , concavity implies x('Y) = f z d"( E A(7r) for 
all i E N. These sets are compact by compactness of X and continuity of Ui, and 
they are convex by convexity of X and concavity of ui .  For all C E  1>, Ac(7r) is also 
nonempty, compact, and convex. And A(7r) = UcEv Ac(7r) is nonempty and compact, 
but not necessarily convex. That A(7r) is continuous as a correspondence follows from 
the arguments in the proof of Theorem 7 in Banks and Duggan (2000) . For all i E N, 
define the optimal proposal correspondence, 
constraining the proposer to A(7r) . By the Theorem of the Maximum (Aliprantis and 
Border 1994, Theorem 14.30) , Mi has nonempty and compact values and is upper hemi­
continuous. However, it is not necessarily convex-valued, since A(7r) is not necessarily 
convex. Let Bi( 7r) = P( Mi( 7r)) denote the set of mixtures of constrained optimal pro­
posals for i, which defines a nonempty-, compact-, convex-valued, upper hemicontinuous 
correspondence (Aliprantis and Border 1994, Theorem 14. 14) . Define the correspondence 
B: [P (X)]n -+-t [P(X)Jn by 
B(7r) = B1(7r) x · · · x Bn(7r) . 
This correspondence is also nonempty-, compact-, convex-valued and upper hemicon­
tinuous (Aliprantis and Border 1994, Theorem 14. 14) . Since [P(X) ]n is convex and 
is compact in the weak topology, Glicksberg's theorem (Aliprantis and Border 1994, 
Corollary 14.50) yields a fixed point of B, which we denote Jr* = ( 7fi , . . .  , 7r�) . We claim 
that CJ"* = ((7r! , Ai(7r*)) ,  . . .  , (7r� , An (7r* ))) is a no-delay stationary equilibrium. By con­
struction, this profile satisfies weak dominance and each 1fi puts probability one on i 's 
utility-maximizing policies in A(7r*) . We have left to check that a proposer i cannot 
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obtain a higher expected payoff by proposing a policy outside A( 7r*) . That payoff is 
(1 - 8)ui (q) + 8vi (CT* ) .  Letting ry* denote the continuation distribution corresponding to 
7f*, concavity implies that payoff is less than or equal to ui(x('Y*) ) .  Since x(ry*) E A(7r*) , 
we have sequential rationality, as required. I 
Theorem 2 Assume either d = 1 or the voting rule 'D is oligarchic. Every no-delay 
stationary equilibrium is in pure strategies. 
Proof: First, assume that d = 1 and 'D is proper. Using the notation from the proof of 
Theorem 1 ,  we first note that A(7r) is convex for all 7f. To see this, let x = max A(7r) and 
.x. = min A(7r) , which exist by compactness of A(7r) , and let C and C. satisfy x E Ac(7r) 
and .x. E Ac(7r) . Letting 'Y = L,iEN Pi1fi , concavity implies x('Y) E [.x., x] = convA(7r) . 
By concavity, we have x('Y) E Ac(7r) n A.a.(7r) . Take any y E convA(7r) , and suppose 
without loss of generality that y E [.x., x('Y)] . Since Ac(1f) is convex , by concavity, we 
have y E Ac (7r) � A(7r ) , as required. If CT is a no-delay stationary equilibrium with 
mixed proposal profile, then it follows that A(7r) is convex. By LSWP, each ui has a 
unique ideal point in X ,  and then d = 1 and concavity yield strict quasi-concavity. Thus, 
each Ui has a unique maximizer in A(7r) , and 1fi must put probability one on that policy. 
Now assume 'D is oligarchic, with c = nC'EV C' . Let O" be any no-delay stationary 
equilibrium. Then A (7r ) = Ac(7r) . Take any i E N, and suppose that distinct policies 
x' and x" solve max{ ui(x) I x E A(7r) }. Letting "( denote the continuation distribution 
corresponding to CT, note that conavity implies x('Y) E A(7r) and, therefore, Ui (x') = 
ui (x") ;::: ui(x('Y)) ;::: (1 - 8)ui (q) +8vi (CT) . Thus, x', x" E Acu{i} (7r ) .  Let C' consist of the 
members j of C U {i }  such that uj (x') > uj (x") ,  and let G be an open set around x' such 
that, for all j E C' and all y E G, we have Uj (y) > Uj( x") . Since x" E Aj ( 7f) for all such j, 
this implies ui(Y) > ( 1-8)u.i (q) +8vj (CT) . Let C" = (CU{i}) \C' consist of the members j 
of CU{ i }  such that Uj ( x") ;::: Uj ( x') .  Of course, i E C". By LSWP and x' E AC' ( 7f) , there 
exists z E X  such that, for all j E C", we have uj(z) > u.i(x') ;::: (1 - 8)uj (q) + 8vj(CT) . 
Choosing a E (0, 1) small enough that Za = (1 - a)x' + ax" E G, concavity implies 
that Uj(Za) > (1 - 8)uj (q) + 8vj (CT) for all j E C. Thus , Za E A( 7r) , and, since i E C", 
we have ui(za) > ui (x') , a contradiction. Therefore, each U;, has a unique maximizer in 
A(7r) , and 7fi must put probability one on that policy. I 
We say that E is upper hemicontinuous if, for every (p, q ,  8, >.) and every open set 
Y � [P(X)]n with E(p, q, 8, >.) � Y, there exists an open set Z � /:::,. x X x [O, 1) x A 
with (p, q , 8, >.) E Z such that, for all (p' , q' , 8' , X) E Z, we have E(p' , q', 8' , X) � Y. 
Theorem 3 The correspondence E of no-delay stationary equilibria is upper hemicon­
tinuous in the parameters of the model. 
Proof: Given parameters p and A, and given a profile 7f of mixed proposal strategies , 
define 
vi(7r , p, A) = L j ui(z, .X) 7rj (dz) 
jEN 
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for all i E N. This would be i 's continuation value if each 7rj put probability one on 
the social acceptance set. By continuity of ui and Billingsley's (1968) Theorem 5 .5 ,  vi 
is jointly continuous. Define 
A(n, p, q ,  8, A) = {x E x I Ui (x) ;::: (1 - o)ui(q, A) + 8vi (1r, p, A)} 
and write Ac(n , p, q, 8, A) and A(n, p, q , 8, A) using the usual conventions . Letting I =  
'E,jEN pj7rj , concavity implies x(r) E Ai( n, p, q, 8, A) for all i E N ,  which implies that the 
correspondence A has non-empty values. Continuity of A follows from Theorem 7 of 
Banks and Duggan (2000) . By the Theorem of the Maximum, the correspondence Mi 
of constrained optimal proposals , defined by 
has nonempty and compact values and is upper hemicontinuous. It follows that the 
correspondence Bi, defined by Bi (n, p, q, 8, A) = P(Mi (7r, p, q, 8, A)) also possesses these 
properties . Since Bi has closed values and regular range as well, it has closed graph 
(Aliprantis and Border 1994, Theorem 14. 1 1 ) .  Now, let (pk, qk, ok , Ak) -t (p0, q0, 8° , A0) , 
and take any sequence { nk} such that nk E E(pk , qk , ok , Ak) for all k. Suppose nk -t n°. 
Since nf E Bi (Pk , qk , ok, Ak) for all k and since Bi has closed graph, we see that nf E 
Bi (p0, q0, 8° , A0) for all i E N. We claim that (5°, with (ji = (nj, Ai (n°, p0 , q0, 8°, A0 )) for 
all i E N, is a no-delay stationary equilibrium. Clearly, legislator acceptance sets satisfy 
weak dominance. If nf does not satisfy sequential rationality, then i 's expected payoff 
from proposing a rejected policy exceeds the payoff from nj, i .e . , 
Since these payoffs are jointly continuous, however, this strict inequality must hold for 
high enough k, contradicting 7rk E E(pk , qk , ok, Ak) .  Therefore, n° E E(p0 , q,0 , 8° ,  A0) , 
and we conclude that E has closed graph.  Since it has compact Hausdorff range space 
as well, it is upper hemicontinuous (Aliprantis and Border 1994, Theorem 14.12) . I 
Theorem 4 Assume 8 > 0 .  A lso assume that there is a decisive coalition C all the 
members of which have strictly concave utility functions, i .e . , Ui is strictly concave for 
all i E C, or that the sum of utilities 'E,iEN � is strictly concave and limited transferability 
is satisfied. Every stationary equilibrium is either no-delay or static. 
Proof' Assume 8 > 0. First , assume there exists C E 'D such that, for all i E C, 
ui is strictly concave. Since 8 < 1 ,  the status quo has positive mass according to the 
continuation distribution I· If (j is not static, then, since 8 > 0, I is not concentrated 
on q ,  so strict concavity implies 
(9) 
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for all i E C. By continuity, there is an open set G around x(t) such that the inequality 
(9) holds for all x E G. Since C E D, we then have G � A. Now consider any legislator 
j E N, and let xi be j 's unique utility-maximizing policy. We claim that there exists 
z E G such that ui (z) > (1 - o)ui(q) + ovi (er) .  This is clearly true if xi = x(t) . 
Otherwise, we have ui (xi) > ui (x('Y)) ;::::: (1 - o)ui(q) + ovi (er) , and the claim follows 
from concavity by setting a E (0, 1) small enough that z = (1 - a)x(1) + axi E G. 
Therefore, by sequential rationality, we have 7ri (A) = 1, so that er is no-delay. 
Now assume that L,iEN ui is strictly concave and that limited transferability is sat­
isfied. Since 8 < 1 ,  the status quo has positive mass according to the continuation 
distribution /· If er is not static, then, since 8 > 0 ,  / is not concentrated on q, so strict 
concavity implies 
iEN iEN 
By concavity of each Ui , it follows that there exists i E N such that ui(x(1)) > (1 -
o)ui(q) + DVi (er) , and sequential rationality then implies that 7ri (A) = 1 .  Furthermore, 
ui (x(t) ) > min{ui(Y) I y E X} . By limited transferability, there exists z E X  such that, 
for all j # i, ui (z) > ui (x(t)) .  Choose a E (0, 1) small enough that Za = (1 -a)x('Y)+az 
satisfies Ui(Za) > (1 - o)ui(q) + Dvi (er) .  By concavity, we have ui (za) > ui (x('Y)) ;::::: 
(1 - o)ui(q) + ovi (er) for all j # i, so Za E A, and sequential rationality then implies 
7ri (A) = 1 for all j # i. Thus, er is no-delay, as required. I 
Theorem 5 Assume that at least two legislators have distinct ideal points . If er is a 
no-delay stationary equilibrium in which every legislator proposes the same policy) i. e. , 
there exists x E X such that 1fi ( { x}) = 1 for all i E NJ then er is static. 
Proof: Let er be a no-delay stationary equilibrium for which there exists x E X such 
that, for all i E N, 7ri( {x}) = 1 .  Thus, the continuation distribution places probability 
1 - 8 on q and probability 8 on x. If er is not static, then x -j. q ,  and it follows that 
x # x(t) . Let C consist of the legislators i such that ui(x) ;::::: (1 - o)ui(q) + ovi (er) , 
i .e . ,  x E A. Since er is no-delay, C E D. Let C' consist of the members j of C such 
that ui (x) > ui (x('Y)) ,  and let G be any open set around x such that, for all j E C' 
and all y E G, we have ui(Y) > ui (x(t)) .  By concavity, it follows that,  for all j E C' 
and all y E G, we also have ui(Y) > (1 - o)ui (q) + ovi (er) . Let C" = c \ C' consist of 
the members j of C such that ui (x(t)) ;::::: ui (x) .  By LSWP, there exists z E X such 
that, for all j E C" , we have ui (z) > ui (x) .  Then choosing a E (0, 1) small enough 
that Za = (1 - a)x + az E G, concavity implies ui (za) > ui (x) ;::::: (1 - o)ui (q) + ovi (er) 
for all j E C" . Therefore, ui (za) > (1 - o)ui (q) + ovi (er) for all j E c, and, since 
C E D,  weak dominance implies Za E A. Suppose C" # 0 ,  and take i E C" . Then 
ui (za) > ui (x) and Za E A contradict sequential rationality. Thus , C = C' , and we 
have � (x) > (1 - o)ui(q) + ovi (er) for all i E C. Since C E D, weak dominance implies 
that x is in the interior of A. Now suppose that ui (Y) > ui (x) for some j E N and 
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y E X. Then, for small enough f3 E (0, 1) ,  we have (1 - f3)x + f3y E A , and, by concavity, 
ui ( (1 - f3)x + f3y) > ui ( x) , contradicting sequential rationality. It follows that x is 
maximal for every legislator i ,  but this contradicts our assumption that at least two 
legislators have distinct ideal points. Therefore, O" is static. I 
Theorem 6 Assume that every decisive coalition has positive recognition probability, 
i. e . , I:,iEC Pi > 0 for all C E  'D. There exists a static stationary equilibrium if and only 
if the status quo is in the core 1 i. e. 1 q E K. 
Proof: Let O" be a static stationary equilibrium, and suppose q ¢:. K, i. e . ,  there exist 
C E 1J and y E X such that ui (Y) > ui(q) = vi (O") for all i E C. By weak dominance, 
y E Ac � A .  Then, for all i E C, sequential rationality implies 1ri(A \ { q}) = 1 .  
But, because I:,iEC Pi > 0, this contradicts the assumption that O" is static. Now let 
q E K, and define O" by having each i E N  propose Pi = q and accept A =  Ri(q) . Since 
vi( O") = ui(q) for all i E N, this profile satisfies weak dominance. If sequential rationality 
is violated, then there exist i E N  and y E A  such that ui(Y) > ui (q) . But y E A implies 
y E Ac for some C E 'D, i.e . ,  ui (Y) ;:::: ui(q) for all i E C. By LSWP, however, there 
exists z E X such that ui( z) > ui( q) for all i E C, contradicting q E K. Therefore, 
sequential rationality is satisfied , and O" is a stationary equilibrium. I 
Corollary 2 Assume that 8 > 01 that Pi > 0 for every legislator i E N, and that 1J is 
non-collegial. If the sum of utilities I:,iEN Ui is strictly concave and limited transferability 
is satisfied, then there are no stationary equilibria with delay. 
Proof: From Theorems 4 and 6, it suffices to show that the core is empty. Take any 
x E X. If ui(x) = min{ui (Y) I y E X} for all i E N, then take any alternative 
z E X \  {x} ,  so that z E RN(x) .  By LSWP, there exists z' E PN(x) ,  i .e. , ui (z') > ui (z) 
for all i E N. Since N E 'D, this shows x ¢:. K. If ui(x) > min{ui (Y) I y E X} for 
some i E N, then limited transferability yields a policy z E X such that, for all j f:. i ,  
Uj (z) > Uj(x) . Since 1J is non-collegial, there exists C E  1J such that i <f. C. Therefore, 
Uj (z) > Uj (x) for all j E C, and it follows that x ¢:. K.  We conclude that K = 0 ,  as 
required. I 
Theorem 7 Assume that Pi > 0 for every legislator i E N. Also assume that d = 1 
and 1J is proper or that 1J is oligarchic. For every no-de lay stationary equilibrium 0"1 
the following implications hold. 
(i) A = {q} B (ii) q E K :::} (iii) q E A. 
Moreover, if 8 > 0, then (iii) :::} (ii) . 
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Proof: Let O" be a no-delay stationary equilibrium. Note that ( i) ==> (ii) holds gener­
ally. Indeed, if A = {q} , then O" is static. That q E K then follows from Theorem 6 .  
The remainder of  the proof is divided into two parts corresponding to  the two sets of 
assumptions in the theorem. 
First ,  assume d = 1 and 1J is proper. We begin by showing (ii) ==> (iii) .  Suppose 
q E K, denote the ideal points of the legislators by Xi, and let x1 :S: x2 :S: · · · :S: xn. 
Then there exist m1 , m2 E N such that K = [xmu Xm2] ,  C1 = { i E N J i > mi } � 1J, 
and C2 = { i E N J i < m2} � 1J .  Let A = [;r, x] . If ;r = x, then all legislators propose 
the same policy and, as long as some legislators have distinct ideal points, Theorem 
5 implies q E A; if all legislators have the same ideal point, then q E K implies that 
ideal point is q, and again q E A. So consider the case x. < x, and suppose q � A. In 
particular, suppose q < x. without loss of generality. Talce any i :S: m1 , and note that x 
minimizes Ui over A. Since O" is no-delay, (2) implies that vi (O") 2:: Ui(x) . Furthermore, 
q E K  implies ui(q) > ui (x) , so we have ui(x) < (1 - 8)ui(q) + 8vi(O") , and then x � Ai 
by weak dominance. Therefore, the legislators who accept x are contained in C1 , and it 
follows that x � A,  a contradiction .  Therefore, q E A. We now suppose 8 > 0 and show 
(iii) ==> (i) .  From the above, this will imply (iii) ==> (ii) ,  as in the theorem. Suppose 
q E A. Let x. = minA and x = max A, and let c_, C E 1J satisfy x. E Ac and x E A0. 
Since 1J is proper, there exists i E Q n  C. Thus, 
Since O" is no-delay, 1(A U { q}) = 1 .  Since q E A, we have 1(A) = 1 .  Since Ui is concave, 
it attains its minimum over A at one of x. or x, i. e . ,  
min{ui(x) J x E A} = min{ui (.X.) , Ui (?f)} .  
Thus, I must put probability one on i 's utility-minimizing socially acceptable proposals, 
i .e . , 
1(argmin{ui (x) I x  E A}) = 1 .  (10) 
As in the proof of Theorem 2, A is convex, so (1/2).x. + (1/2)x E A. Then sequential 
rationality implies 
where the strict inequality above follows from strict quasi-concavity. But this, 8 > 0, 
and Pi > 0 ,  contradict (10) . Therefore, x. = x  and A =  {q} .  Finally, we show (ii) ==> (i) . 
Suppose q E K. From the above ,  A =  {q} follows if 8 > 0, so suppose 8 = 0 .  Again let 
x1 :S: x2 :::; · · · :::; Xn and K = [xmu xffl2] , and consider any x < q. By weak dominance, 
Ai = Ri,(q) ,  and, by concavity, the legislators who accept x therefore satisfy Xi < q. 
Thus, i accepts x only if xi < Xm2 ,  and this coalition cannot be decisive. We conclude 
that x � A, and a similar argument holds for x > q, as required. 
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Now assume that D is oligarchic, and let c = no'EV C' . If Ui (q) � Vi (a-) for some i E 
C, then we claim that q = Pj for all j E N. Since O" is no-delay and Pi > 0 for all j E N, 
we have Pi E A = Ao for all j .  Since i E C, it follows that ui(Pj) � (1 - o)ui ( q) + ovi( O") 
for all j E N. Then 
Vi (O") = L pjUi (Pj) � (1 - o)ui(q) + ovi (O") 
jEN 
implies that Vi (O") � Ui(q) ,  so we have Vi(O") = ui(q) .  Furthermore, Pi E Ai becomes 
ui(Pi) � ui(q) , and then Pi > 0 for all j E N  and 
Vi(O") = L pjUi (Pj) � Ui(q) = Vi(O") 
iEN 
imply that Ui (Pi ) = Ui(q) for all j E N. If it is not the case that all legislators propose q, 
then there exists j E N  such that Pi =f. x('y) . Let C' consist of the members h of C such 
that uh(Pi) > uh(x('y)) ,  and let G be an open set around Pi such that, for all h E C' 
and all y E G, we have uh(Y) > uh(x('y)) .  By concavity, for all h E C' and all y E G, we 
also have Uh(Y) > (1 - o)uh(q) + Dvh(O" ) .  Let C" = c \ C' consist of the members h of 
C such that uh(x('y)) � uh(Pi ) ·  Of course, i E C. By LSWP, there exists z E X  such 
that, for all h E C", we have uh(z) > uh(Pi) ·  Choosing a E (0, 1 ) small enough that 
Za = (1 - a)pi + az E G, concavity implies that uh(za) > uh(Pi) � (1 - o)uh(q) + Dvh(O") 
for all h E C. Thus, Uh(Za) � (1 - o)uh(q) + Dvh(O") for all h E c. Since c E 'D, this 
implies Za E A. Then sequential rationality implies that 
where the strict inequality follows from i E C, contradicting ui(Pi)  = Ui (q) . Therefore, 
ui (q) ;:::: Vi (O") implies Pi = q for all j E N. 
We now show (ii) =} (iii) . Suppose q E K but q � A. Then there exists j E C 
such that ui (q) < (1 - O)ui (q) + Ovi (O") , SO 0 > 0 and, by concavity, ui (q) < ui (x('y) ) .  
Since q E K, there exists i E C such that ui (q) ;:::: ui (x('y)) � (1  - o)ui(q) + ovi (O") , 
and, since 8 > 0, we have ui(q) ;:::: Vi (O") . Thus, we have Pi = q for all j E N, but then 
x('y) = q, contradicting ui (q) < uj(x('y)) .  Therefore, q E A. We next show (iii) =} (i) , 
assuming 8 > 0 .  From the above, this will imply (iii) =} (ii) , as in the theorem. If 
q E A, then, for all i E C, we have ui(q) � (1 - o)ui(q) + ovi (O") . Since 8 > 0, this 
implies Ui (q) ;:::: Vi (O") , so again Pi = q for all j E N. Suppose there exists x E A 
with x =f. q .  Then ui(x) ;:::: (1 - o)ui (q) + ovi (O") = ui(q) for all i E C. By LSWP, 
there exists z E X such that ui (z) > ui (q) for all i E C, and therefore z E A. Then 
sequential rationality implies that, for all i E C, we have ui(Pi)  � ui(z) > ui (q) = ui (Pi) , 
a contradiction. Therefore, A =  {q} . Finally, we show (ii) =} (i) . Suppose q E K. From 
the above, A = {q} follows if 8 > 0, so let 8 = 0. Suppose there exists x E A with 
x =f. q, so ui(x) � 'lti(q) for all i E C. But then, by LSWP, there exists z E X  such that 
ui (z) > ui(q) for all i E C, contradicting q E K. Therefore, A =  {q} , as required. I 
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Theorem 9 Assume that d = 1 and 1J is proper or that 1J is oligarchic . In every no­
delay stationary equilibrium er, some legislator proposes a policy in the core, i .e . ,  Pi E K 
for some i E N. 
Proof: First, assume d = 1 and 1J is proper . Let A = [.x., x] . Denote the ideal points 
of the legislators by xi, and let x1 :s; x2 :s; · · · :s; xn. Since d = 1 and 1J is proper, 
there exist m1, m2 E N such that K = [xm1 ' Xm2L ct = {i E N I xi :'.:'. XmJ E 1J, and 
ct = {i E N  I Xi :s; Xm2} E 1J. If Xm2 < x(t) , then, for all i E C2, we have 
i.e. , xffi2 E Ac2 •  Since C2 E 1J, we have Xm2 E A, and, by sequential rationality, 
Pm2 = Xm2 · Similarly, if x(I) < Xm1 ,  then Xm1 E A and Pmi = Xm1 • If Xm1 :s; x(t) :s; Xm2, 
then, since x( /) E A, we have A n  K -=/= 0 .  Then, by sequential rationality, Pmi = Xm1 if 
it is in A or Pm1 = min A E K  otherwise . 
Now assume 1J is oligarchic, with C = nc'E'D C', and consider i E C and any proposal 
Pi E A for legislator i. If Pi � K, then there exists x E X such that ,  for all j E C, 
uj (x) > uj(Pi) · Since Pi E A, there exists C' E 1J such that, for all j E C' , ui (Pi) :'.:'. 
(1 - 8)uj (q) + Duj (p) . Since C � C' , we have Uj (x) > (1 - 8)uj (q) + Duj (p) for all j E C, 
which implies x E A. But then Ui (x) > Ui(Pi) violates sequential rationality. Therefore, 
we must have Pi E K  in every no-delay equilibrium. I 
Theorem 10 Assume that Pi > 0 for every legislatori E N. Also assume that d = 1 and 
1J is proper or that 1J is collegial. Let ok -----+ 1, and let {erk} be a corresponding sequence 
of no-delay stationary equilibria with social acceptance sets {Ak} . Then D(Ak , K) -----+ 0 .  
Proof: In case 1J is  collegial , specify i E ncE'D C arbitrarily, so that A k � Af for all k. 
Since each erk is no-delay, this implies that 
(11) 
for every legislator j E N and for all k .  In case d = 1 and 1J is proper, let yk = min A k 
and zk = maxAk for all k, and let c_k, Ck E 1J satisfy yk  E A.Qk and zk E A0k .  Since 
1J is proper, there exists ik E Ck n Ck. Going to a subsequence if necessary, we may 
assume that ik = i for all k .  Thus , we have 
for all k, where the first equality uses convexity of Ak, established in the proof of Theorem 
2, and concavity of Ui · Since 7rJ (Ak) = 1 for all j and k, we again have ( 11 ) .  Thus, there 
exists a subsequence of {erk} for which (11) holds for all j and all k .  In the next three 
paragraphs, we consider such a subsequence deduce further properties of it. 
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Define wf (j) to be the expected payoff to legislator i when j is selected to propose 
in the equilibrium O"k ,  i. e . ,  
w7(j) = j ui(x) 7rj(dx) , 
and note that vi(O"k) = L,jEN pjwf (j) .  Letting 
fk E arg min{wf (j ) I j E N} and hk E arg max{wf(j) I j E N}, 
equations (11)  and (12) imply 
wf(fk) > (1 - 8k)ui(q) + 8kphkwf(hk) + 8k L pjwf(j) 
j#hk 
which implies that 
> (1  - 8k)ui(q) + 8kphkwf(hk) + 8k (l - Phk)wf(fk) ,  
(12) 
(13) 
for all k.  Since P(X) is compact in the weak topology, the sequence { ( 7r�, . . .  , 7r�) } has a 
convergent subsequence (also indexed by k) with limit , say, (7r1 , . . .  , 7rn) · For all j E N, 
define Wi (j) = J uid7rj . Since Ui is continuous, weak convergence implies wf(j) 4 wi (j) , 
and then (13) implies that wlj) is independent of j, i .e . ,  there exists wi such that 
wi(j) = wi for all j E N .  In general, for any legislator j ,  weak convergence implies that 
the sequence {vj (O"k)} of continuation values converges to 
and for legislator i we have 
Vi = lim vi (O"k) = lim L pjw7 (j) = Wi 
jEN 
(14) 
(15) 
as well. Letting 'Yk be the continuation distribution corresponding to  O"k , concavity 
implies x( 1) E Aj for all j and k ,  or in other words Uj (X("fk) ) ;:::: ( 1 - 8k)uj (q)+ 8kvj (O"k) 
for all j and k. Letting 'Y denote the limit of continuation distributions, which is jus t  
L,jEN pj7rj , weal<: convergence implies x('Yk) 4 x('Y) , the mean of the probability measure 
"(, and then, by continuity, we have uj(x('Y)) ;:::: Vj for all j E N. 
We claim that, for all j E N, 7rj is the point mass on x('Y) . If not, then there exists an 
open set G around x( 'Y) , a legislator j ,  and a subsequence of { ( 7r� , . . .  , 7r�)} (still indexed 
by k) such that, for all k ,  we have 7rJ (X \ G) > 0. Letting Sk denote the support of 7rj , 
this is equivalent to Sk \ G =I- 0 for all k. Thus , for each k,  there exists xk E Sk \ G, 
and going to a subsequence (still indexed by k) if needed, we assume that xk 4 x. For 
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all k,  since CTk is no-delay, there exists Ck E 'D such that xk E A�. Note that i E Ck by 
(11) .  Again going to  a subsequence (still indexed by k) if needed, we may assume that 
Ck = C for all k, and of course i E C. Thus, uh(xk) 2::: (1 - ok)uh (q) + okvh(CTk) for all 
h E C. An implication of continuity and (14) is then that uh(x) 2::: Vh for all h E C. Let 
C' consist of the members h of C such that uh(x) > uh(x(!)) ,  and let G' be any open set 
around x such that, for all h E C' and all y E G', we have uh(Y) > uh(x(r) ) .  It follows 
that, for all h E C' and all y E G' , we also have uh(Y) > vh. Let C" = C \ C' consist 
of the members h of C such that uh(x(r)) 2::: uh(x) .  By LSWP, there exists z E X  such 
that, for all h E C" , we have uh(z) > uh(x) . Then choosing a E (0, 1)  small enough 
that Za = (1 - a)x + az E G', concavity implies uh(za) > uh(x) 2::: vh for all h E C". 
Therefore, E = minhEc(uh(za) - vh) > 0, and by (14) we have 
Uh(za) 2::: (1 - Ok)uh( q) + OkVh( CTk) + � 
for all h E C and for high enough k .  Since C E  'D, it follows from weak dominance that 
Za E A k ,  and then, since i E C,  sequential rationality then implies that 
wf (i) 2::: (1 - ok)uh(q) + okvi(ci) + �· 
But this inequality, with (15) ,  yields 
1. k( ' ) l ' k 
E E 
Wi = im wi i 2::: lm vi + 2 = Vi + 2 > Wi ' 
a contradiction. Thus, each 7rJ indeed converges to the point mass on x(I) .  
We now claim that x( /)  E K.  If not, then there exist y E X and C E 'D such that, 
for all j E C, we have Uj (y) > 'l.lj (x(r) ) .  From the above argument, it follows that 
Vj = uj (x(r) ) for all j E N, and so we have Uj(Y) > (1 - ok)uj(q) + okvj (CTk) for all j E C  
and for high enough k .  Thus, y E Ak for high enough k .  Let wj(j) = J Uj1fj be j 's 
expected payoff when she proposes. This converges to uj( x( I) ) ,  since 1fj converges to the 
point mass on x('y) , and sequential rationality then implies wj(j ) 2::: Uj (Y) > Uj (x(r)) = 
lim wj (j ) for all j E C  and for high enough k ,  a contradiction. Thus, we conclude that 
x(r) E K. 
Finally, if not D(Ak , K) -; 0, then there must exist E > 0 and a subsequence (also 
indexed by k) such that D (Ak , K) 2::: E for all k .  We have shown that there is a further 
subsequence (also indexed by k) such that each 7rf converges to the point mass on some 
x E K. Then d(Ak ,  x) 2::: E implies that there exist yk E Ak and ck E 'D such that 
d(yk , x) > E/2 and yk E A�k . Going to a subsequence (still indexed by k) if needed, we 
may assume Ck = C for all k and yk -; y. Thus, we have ui(Yk) 2::: (1- ok)ui( q) +okvi( CTk) 
for all i E C and all k, and continuity then implies Ui(Y) 2::: ui (x) for all i E C. Since 
d(y , x) 2::: E/2, we have y =/= x ,  and by LSWP, there exists z E X  such that ui(z) > Ui (x) 
for all i E C. Thus, for high enough k, we have 14(z) > (1 - ok)ui(q) + okvi(CTk) for 
all i E C, which implies z E Ak for high enough k. Sequential rationality then implies 
wf(i) 2::: ui(z) > ui(x) = lim wf (i) for high enough k, a contradiction. Therefore, 
D(Ak, K) indeed converges to zero. I 
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